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our contributors

This issue of *JJCL* begins and ends with two contributions from two former teachers of the Department who were also two major writers of their era in Bengal. Buddhadeva Bose's article was written presumably for a Miller festschrift; Sudhindranath's jottings on Mallarmé were prepared as teaching notes. We are grateful to Srimati Pratibha Bose and the School of Cultural Texts and Records — the custodian of Hirendranath Datta Memorial Trust archives, Jadavpur University — for allowing us to print these invaluable pieces.

In spite of our best and time-taking effort, we regret to note that ultimately we have not been able to use diacritics for Sanskrit quotations in Dr. Bhavatosh IndraGuru's article. He tried twice, but as these were not impeccably done, we decided to do away with them. We also tried at our end to put them in order; but there had been innumerable variant readings! This points at the necessity of preparing authentic and standard editions of Indian classical texts. Dr. IndraGuru teaches in the Department of English and Other European Languages of Dr. H. S. Gour Visvavidyalaya, Sagar, Madhya Pradesh. Dr. Anindita Banerjee is an Assistant Professor in Comparative Literature, Cornell University, USA. Professor Probal Dasgupta, the Dean, Faculty of Humanities, University of Hyderabad, is a specialized linguist. Dr. Sieghild Bogumil-Notz is a scholar in Germanistics with CL orientations and teaches at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany. A specialist in narrative studies, Professor Tirthankar Chattopadhyay teaches in the Department of English, University of Kalyani, West Bengal. Sri Sudev Pratim Basu teaches English at the Department of English & Other Modern European Languages, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan. Sri Sayantan Dasgupta did his Bachelor's and Master's at the CL department and has now joined JU as a faculty member. His co-author Sri Saikat Maitra after doing his Master's in CL at JU is taking a research training course at CSSS, Calcutta.

The Editor expresses his genuine apologies for the inordinate delay in bringing out this issue.

of the éclat conferred on it by writers, artists, scholars, and cranks who have been or are residents. My days in California followed a rather conventional pattern— three or four universities, a Vedanta Ashrama, a midnight Easter Mass, a Hollywood studio, a garish striptease, San Francisco. When finally I boarded a plane for Monterey, I did not quite know what to expect, outside what I had learnt from Miller's letters.

Within minutes of getting out at the airport, where I was met by a friend of Miller's, I saw a strange country being revealed to me, mile after mile, at a pace too fast for my voracious eyes. At the waterfront right outside the airport, I had snatched a couple of minutes to buy a lobster for my host, but had no time to mingle in the crowd that inevitably gathers at such places, or have a drink at some fishermen's bar, or observe the varieties of marine creatures they had hauled up. These wayside temptations had to be resisted, for Miller had advised me to reach his place before sunset and my pilot was apparently in a hurry. On one side of us was Balboa's blue Pacific, and on the other an endless row of hills, each detached from the other, densely forested, with a house on each hilltop. Occasionally, leaning on the parapet of some enclosure, were groups of children watching the seals; occasionally, buzzards wheeling. Bathed in a southern April, luminous in the glow of a descending sun, a whole wonderful world flashed past the car-window— green, golden, undulating, abundant. This, then, was Big Sur. As many hills as families, as many houses as hills. One lone house on each hilltop, each home overlooking the ocean. No street-names or house-numbers, no cafes or drug-stores, no billboards or drive-in cinemas. The only means to identify the houses were the capacious iron mail-boxes which their owners had planted on the highway, with their names prominently displayed. Here was God's plenty, every man in God's own acre, every man with his green hill and a window on infinity, a world which had not yet lost its simple, primeval grandeur but which a modicum of civilization had made safe for refugees from civilisation. Here it was still possible to believe that Nature is benevolent.

Trees, shrubs, fallen leaves, a rough roadway: the car zigzagged up the hill marked by Miller's mailbox. The ocean of which I had only caught glimpses from the highway now revealed its full, wide expanse, with a mild vermilion sun on the horizon. Against this backdrop was the tall figure of my host, standing in front of the long wooden building

which was his home. He gave me a handshake which it is a pleasure to remember. This Occidental mode of greeting is sometimes reduced to skeletal formality, especially by ladies who offer you two cold fingers, beautifully manicured but scarcely animate, or guarded by a glove in the latest style. Conversely, there are men who stretch towards you an entire arm, straight as a sword, and grip your hand for a couple of seconds while muttering the appropriate polite formula, without any relaxation of their facial muscles. Neither this soldier-like gesture, nor the momentary yielding of mauve finger-tips extends beyond the barest recognition of the existence of the stranger who has just been introduced. But Miller's handshake was full and firm and strong, as warm and *personal* as his letters, as the books he had written and pictures he had painted. Within the next five minutes I became one of his family.

Never, long as I live, will I forget the few days I had spent with the Millers, days snatched out of a somewhat hectic lecture-tour, during which my brain had stored more impressions than it knew what to do with— faces and places which dissolved one into another, friendships ended when scarcely begun, landscapes whose message I hadn't yet deciphered. Repose I found with the Millers, something more than pleasure, something humanly shared and assimilated into experience. Henry, turned sixty, slim, straight grey-haired, his face kind yet austere; Eve, his wife, full-lipped, fresh-complexioned, a model of mature beauty; Tony and Val (Henry's children by an earlier marriage about whom he has written so often and joyously), both blue-eyed, flaxen-haired, charming, amiable. Miller gave me the impression of being loose-limbed, relaxed, capable of hours of inaction, hours of reverie, slow and gentle in speech, careful in the choice of words, a marvellous listener, graceful in the gestures of his hands. I enjoyed the points of contrast between him and Eve. Henry had the "un-American" habit of writing his letters in longhand (what was more, with the nearly demoded fountain-pen instead of the "ball-point" which had already started on its triumphal march), whereas Eve never "penned" a line except on a typewriter. Before I had known her for one hour, Eve urged me to call her by her first name (quite an usual procedure in America and one which I since learnt to appreciate), but Henry, while drawing me into the warmth of his friendship and affection, never used any form of address except

"Mr. Bose", which revealed a certain temperamental affinity between him and us of the Old World. No doubt his long expatriation in Europe had left its mark on Miller; he seemed world-weary, rather reserved, whereas Eve, so far as I could make out, had all the charm, the frankness, the vivacity, and the exuberance of the modern American woman.

Even more remarkable was the contrast between Miller's literary style and his personality: the latter, impressive in a quiet, subdued way, reticent almost, marked with a certain "holding back" of himself, meditative, part-oriental; and the former a torrent of energy, a tide of American vigour, a medley of ideas, quotations, narratives, allusions, reflections and memories, a gust of enthusiasm which showed no respect for "form" and dispensed with those undertones, nuances, and convolutions which constitute the French idea of "le style". How bold and direct and straightforward was everything he wrote, and how restrained his conversation!

What did we talk about? Books and writers. Henry Miller's joustings with life, *Big Sur*, India, America. "You won't find a single home in America where someone will say to you, 'This was my grandfather's chair.' We are becoming a race of nomads." Reflecting on my flat on Rashbehari Avenue where one room served me as bed-living-room-cum-study, I said that to most people these days ancestral furniture might be an embarrassment rather than a valued possession. "There is much to say for the dynamism of American life," I added. "But one needs some centre, after all." Miller replied. "Something one can hold on to, some idea of *home*." I recalled a passage in *The Colossus of Maroussi* where Miller says how he taught himself to "feel at home at home." I asked him if he had read Tagore. No, he had not, but his temple had a niche for Ramakrishna. He wanted to go to India, just to see a real saint. "Oh, no," I protested with some alarm, "saints are rare everywhere. One of the misfortunes of India is that anyone who claims to be a saint is regarded as one by the multitude." The transition from Ramakrishna to Rimbaud was easy enough, and Rimbaud led to Blaise Cendrars and his (Miller's) life in Paris. When Eve joined us after washing the dishes I asked her what she thought of life at *Big Sur*. Well, it was sort of fun, with the nearest shopping centre in Carmel, not even a drug-store anywhere near, and no telephones. (This was in 1954; I do not know about later.) One had to drive miles for the smallest

necessity, one had to stir out in any weather to fetch one's mail. "This is also the American way, isn't it?" I suggested. "The spirit of the pioneers." "That's true," Eve nodded, may be without much conviction. "But I do miss the telephone, I've never lived without one, and sometimes I can hear it ringing even here." As the night deepened and we re-filled our glasses, Miller let fall a few words on a topic he has written about so movingly: the time of his youth and hardship. There was a time when he worked with Western Union in New York, a time when he was unemployed and did not want to be employed, when he went about hungry and traded his topcoat for a taxi-ride at the end of winter, but never a time when he did not devour books and gaze at art-dealers' windows, never a time when he did not want to be a writer. "I became one," he added with a wry smile, "but even now there may be days when I can't spare a dime to write a friend abroad." I realised his situation was like certain middle-aged Bengali authors whose work had brought them fame but very little money— a most embarrassing combination.

Miller and I parted for the night at the door of the log-cabin which he had rented for me to sleep in. Near it was the Pacific Bend, famed for its hot sulphur springs. In a glimmering moonlight the ocean was faintly visible. I gave the landscape a few minutes before turning in. A thin moon hanging over the sea and flattened by the sea-fogs; above it, towering darkness reaching up to the zenith, perforated by stars. My cabin lay in the shadow of a huge hill of which I could make out but the barest outline. There was a rippling breeze, not a cat in sight, not a whirr of a passing automobile; only a faint swish of the ocean and the breathing of the voiceless trees. As I switched off the light, the darkness grew as black as a mother's womb and in my ears the silence began to buzz like cicadas. I had an intense feeling of the reality of night— deep, dark, mysterious, overwhelming, a flood on which my consciousness was rocked, not to slumber, but back and forth between memories of loves and friendships, from one dream to another, dreams of happiness found and lost, and regained but to be lost again. What I felt was in fact an incipient poem, faintly tapping at my door, like a waif left out in the cold. I wanted to let it in: a first line formed itself in my mind, a vague shape, shadowy stanzas, ghostly rhythms, but before I could get any further the night itself was obliterated in sleep.

The next thing I remember is the Pacific, sharply curved like a half-moon, clinging as it were to the earth with two arms outstretched, seen in the morning light from a window of the restaurant perched on the edge of the ocean. Miller came down just as I was finishing breakfast.

Big Sur evokes in my mind vivid splashes of colour, emanating from the redwood forest where green and purple shadows darkened the

I think, which gave a peculiar quality to this visit, a roundness which the years have not blurred, a savour which I can still distinctly recall.

From the moment of my arrival to that of my taking off for Portland, there was never an hour when Miller made himself unavailable, although

and wanted to write; that part of me which I cannot but regard as my real self was completely hidden from his view. But I had read some of his works and was familiar with his background and ideas; even before meeting him I had known him in a way in which there was no possibility of his knowing me. And this I thought was the most touching aspect of his friendship— that he had accepted me on trust, as though he had discerned the worth which exists, if at all, not in me, properly speaking, but in what I write in Bengali.

For quite some time Miller remained one of my strongest links with America. His letters reached me in Paris and Rome, then in Calcutta, followed by parcels of his books with touching inscriptions. A second meeting did not take place, despite my subsequent travels in the

Occident; the correspondence naturally flagged. Even so, I had occasionally heard from him, at intervals of months or years, through some magazine or clipping he had mailed, or a phone call from one of his friends passing through Calcutta. And I heard about him, too, from mutual friends in New York, who told me he was separated from Eve, had abandoned *Big Sur*, returned to Europe but had an alternative home in Pacific Palisades, California. I rejoiced over his soaring sales and his legal and moral triumph with *Tropic of Cancer*. In one way and another I have felt close to him, despite distance and silence, always, since the time of our meeting at Big Sur. It no longer seems very likely that I shall see him again, but I know I shall remember him as a friend, as a good, wonderful, big-hearted man, and a writer of significance.

As I finish writing these words, Henry Miller arrives at the age of seventy-five. Comes the time for an "appraisal" of his works, for the tiger to be put into an academic cage. The American zeal for research did not leave him alone even during his Big Sur days, and latterly I have heard his name mentioned in hushed tones by Harvard undergraduates. Soon the professors will have their hooks on him in right earnest; he will be dissected, labelled, anatomised, atomised. Some will say (perhaps this has been said already) that he represents that phase of twentieth century literature which was nihilistic, perverted, anti-art, that in his novels the concepts of character and situation are demolished, that his novels are not novels at all, but long, rambling monologues of a non-professional philosopher, that his essays could be anthologised to make a Henry Miller novel. Others, because of his explorations into the mysteries of sex and his flouting of formal conventions, will make him a precursor of Robbe-Grillet and the "new novel". Perhaps he will be described as an American D. H. Lawrence, and a writer whose mania was confession. There will be some truth in all this. True, he is one of the least "objective" of writers, one of the most autobiographical, one who breaks through the distinction between reality and fiction, the "true" and the "invented" story. In a sense everything he has written is about himself; his Rimbaud is another incarnation of Henry Miller, his *Big Sur* is an overflow of Henry Miller, even his *Greece* is an extension of his eccentricities. It is also true that this is one of the reasons why his books give us such a delicious sense of freedom, of release from our

oppressive analytical intellect. But I hope the American tone of his writings will also be noted, despite his avowed "anti-Americanism". He has a sense of wonder, a receptivity, a sponge-like quality of mind, and a love of Nature, which link him with classical American writers, especially Whitman and Thoreau. (I think a very profitable comparison may be made between *Walden* and Miller's *Big Sur and the Oranges of Hieronymus Bosch*; they belong to the same indefinite genre and have a similar philosophy.) It seems to me that Miller retains the essence of the Brooklyn boy who ran away from home and finally made good; I perceive in him a certain innocence, reflected in his wide-eyed, open-armed attitude to life and the verve with which he plunges into it, which distinguishes him from his European contemporaries, such as Aldous Huxley and Jean-Paul Sartre. What Miller said of Whitman may as well be said of him, that he liked a great many things and disliked very few. His books make us feel that it is still possible to be happy— in Brooklyn, Big Sur, Paris, Greece, Tibet— anywhere. And just because this feeling comes to me very seldom, I value Henry Miller and his books, as I admire the Brahmanical fastidiousness with which he has abjured all temptations— money, drugs, politics and such like— that are likely to bedevil a writer in our time.

REINVENTING IDIOMS FOR POETICS: DHVANI AS A CONTEMPORARY MODEL

European literary theories dealing with artistic creation, artistic situation and artistic configuration do not give adequate answers with regard to situation, creation and organisation of the categories in an ideal set-up. In each, one comes across large-scale constructive fallacies in that each tends to become local, situational and occasional. This situation is more seriously observed in Aristotle, Arnold, Richards, Coleridge, Newcritics and Poststructuralists. In them the emphasis is laid on obtaining a value equivalent for language and meaning and diversifying both without obtaining alternative coordinates. On the other hand, Eliot, Structuralists, and others believe in identifying and isolating language and meaning as wholesome formations in which potential of inter-transformation and inter-signification is always imminent and absolute. Yet it is not without fault that they are to be accepted. In pursuing their concepts they have indicated a strong leaning for selectional and preferential environment of the participating categories and because of that the theories lack a committed form and structure. In a background such as this, a case for an ancient Indian critical system, known by the name Dhvani, could well be established. In Dhvani, the artistry obtains homogeneous and heterogeneous expansion in relation to its contents, constructs and categories.

The Dhvani system of Indian poetics deals with the constitution of internal and external creative environments primarily with emphases on increasing universality on both the levels or stages. Since universal creative order is basic to Dhvani, the conceptual frames employed in this system are remarkable for two broad specifications: the internal creative environment is created, constituted and developed by such primary models as words, letters, syllables, sentences and therefore each of the primary models needs to be cognised,¹ in the first place, by the mode of appropriate transformation. On the other hand, primary

categories like Bhāva, Sthāyi-Bhāva, Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Sañcārī Bhāva are proportionately signified individually and in combination with each other retaining the perspectives in which they were introduced. In this way, appropriate transformation of primary models and proportional signification of primary categories set a pattern for two basic approaches to create universal creative order that is central to Dhvani system. This calls for re-interpretation of Dhvani as being constituted out of differential conceptualisation of modes such as appropriate transformation and proportional signification and rationalised in a specific mode of suggestion which follows as a necessary consequence of differential conceptualisation. It could be seen that expansion of external aspect, including denotative facts and internal level cohering the categories create simultaneous effects of applicability.

II

Conceptual² levels incorporate an effective modelised perspective insofar as applicability of the element of cognition remains definitive in each of the stages. This is the way to create elementary discourse between aspects of denotation and facts of suggestion and at least four orders are specified because of this: appropriate transformation, cognitive simultaneity, modelised applicability, and positional changes. Appropriate transformation is a linguistic change towards significant proportion in response to the emerging states of meaningfulness. The way in which transformation becomes appropriate could be understood by recognising independent status of primary linguistic models like letters, words, syllables and sentences in the first place, and Bhāva, Sthāyi-Bhāva, language, thought, *Pratibhā* and the like in the second place. It is now worth our while to understand the exact nature of stated structures. Appropriate transformation is a reorganisation of significant propositions in relation to the minor linguistic units. The process begins with a word at the bottom of the scale³ which becomes meaningful because of the suppression of denotative position. Word has an important role to play in conceptual development and it has been considered as an object of organisation whose referential and suggestive aspects are equally heightened. Abhinavagupta⁴ explains how word becomes an element of heightening by subsuming itself into larger fact. The processes that go on to make word a significant proposition include correlative

development of a uniform assertion so as to exclude the insignificant and include the significant, in that way; 'word' operates both on exclusive and inclusive levels. On the exclusion level, words become instruments of transformation and inclusiveness primarily withholds factual notation. An examination like that mainly suggests that the word is a development of a notational concept in an organised setup of emerging models. Another fact that calls for our attention, in our examination of word, is that the creative freedom, of necessity, admits a degree of naturalness in words by calling for emotive, linguistic and verbal significations⁵. Emotive signification of a word is a development of concept and concrete positions in relation to the comprehension of creative status of primary models. Linguistic and verbal significations, in the same way, are appropriate responses in specific mediums.

Another basic mode that opens into transforming category is that of 'letters' and 'syllables'. Anandavardhana's qualifications for such a mode are briefly stated to be formal adequacy of content and the context⁶. Adequacy of content is relative in nature because it develops homogeneity in specific models in such a way that either 'letters' or 'syllables' become well developed in appropriateness as well as concreteness. Anandavardhana's understanding of the aspect provides, at least, some hints as to how letters and syllables could be organised in such a way.

Letters and syllables contextualise the given situational event (Bhāva and the like) in appropriateness of the specific situation and in that way, it is mutual reversibility of the presentative models that becomes most important in our understanding of how letters and syllables create conceptual system. In that way there are certain broad conclusions which need to be arrived at before we could understand the whole process of appropriate transformation. Appropriate transformation identifies models in order of conceptual hierarchy and the degree in which meaningfulness is simultaneously achieved. While we consider the following verses, we are brought nearer to the whole formulation:

Call the rollers of big Cigars
The muscular one and bid him whip
In kitchen cups concupiscent curds

(Wallace Stevens, 'The Emperor of Ice Cream')

Here in these verses one understands how the distinction in order

of the words corresponds to the nativity of enriched experience. 'Rollers of big cigars' suggests an idea of privilege in possession of the maximum. The words have combination in relative sequence with 'roller' as an organizing principle; 'cup and curd', on the other hand, operate as important situations opting for marginal placement bringing inequality of the centre.

III

Acceptance of reversible modes of transformation of linguistic models as a fact in Dhvani system suggests the development of operative knowledge on primary as well as secondary levels of connotational systematisation and notational specification. This operative knowledge becomes a distinctive structure in which modes of comprehension of the linguistic units is always possible through the patterns that emerge in the equivalent standards; it is therefore appropriate to include all such recognised stages in cognitive simultaneity and for that matter, include development of operative knowledge, optional discursion in internal and external linguistic expansion. Earliest accessibility of such a development could be seen in the constitution, denotation and suggestion of Bhāva and other categories as measures of inter-signification.⁷ Bhāva for Anandavardhana is an effect of notional constitution of relative proposition which includes specification and comprehension in each of the stages of such a development. Bhāva in that way (in Ānandavardhana's understanding) is formal integrative habit which is operative in the different modes of creative ability. This ability shows itself in Internalisation, Appropriation, Notation and Adequate Contextualisation. Constitution of Bhāva begins with internalisation of poetic qualities and this internalisation is effectively constructed through Rasas like Erotic (Sṛṅgāra) and Pathetic (Karuṇa). If the Rasa is Erotic, sweetness will, of necessity, be extended over to word and meaning. In Furious (Raudra), on the other hand, forcefulness is conveyed through sound and sense. It follows from this that greater organisation on every level of poetical categories could be arrived at if the poet has any good understanding of Rasa and attendant moods. Internalisation, in that way, becomes recreation of factual tendencies in which concretisation is distributed in stages. The first stage is the stage of appropriate orientation with degrees of formal adequacy reached by the conforming units of holistic

categories. Formal adequacy develops into an enriched proposition which justifies the admission of proportion of direction in Bhāva. Second instance is covered by logical necessity and confirmation of positive categories and in that way, two phases in which definite position are restored substantially and to the extent of precision become the phases of appropriate orientation and formal adequacy. In the following verses, we can just understand how the situation functions:

You think it horrible that lust and rage
Should dance attendance upon my old age;
They were not such a plague when I was young:
What else have I to spur me into the song?

(W.B. Yeats, 'The Spur')

The poet constitutes an apparatus of committed magnitudes of the words and senses. 'You' is poet's extension into functional system; 'horrible' is reckoned intensity of non-participation in physical events. Horrible has Vyābhicārī-Bhāva in Jugupsā and is poet's urge for indulgence into the system. Everything is remarkable happening at the level of Vivakṣitavācya (Dance, plague, spur me into the song). Poet conceives an order of function in the various words (You, horrible, rage, dance).

The way in which Bhāva becomes constituted for the sake of denotation and suggestion is remarkable and internalisation is conditionally a proportional phase for organisation and distribution of concrete tendencies. Appropriation in the next place appears to be more definitive development of such an order and it includes rich contentive perspectives in both formal and informal orders. One of the earliest recognitions of the same fact comes from the mutual tendency of 'lapsing' in which syllables, words, sentences create an equivalent perspective for respective emotional and imaginative statuses which in turn constitute correlation phase for Bhāva. Lapse, in that way is a developed coalescence of conforming categories. What is important for ourselves to understand is that Bhāva having been cognised and appropriated variates through lapsing features and now it becomes possible to include two more broad tendencies in the conceptual status of Bhāva. The actual position that appropriate words and equivalent Bhāvas are transferred to each of the next positive categories and such an event is constitutionally better denoted and suggested by the necessary organisation of the creative

environment. Mammata, Panditaraja Jagannatha, Mahimabhatta, Abhinavagupta and Rajasekhara have very well understood the importance of such an aspect. Mammata, for example, states that Bhava is meaningful only because it is constituted and created through merging categories like Vibhāva, and Anubhāva but Abhinavagupta⁸ does not agree with Mammata; rather he specifies an independent status and existence to Bhāva, and as he says, Bhāva is a normative proposition which generalises the incomprehensible inequivalence by assigning reciprocal simultaneity to each of the conceptual propositions. For example, Sthāyī-Bhāva, Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Sañcārī-Bhāva exist independently of one another so long and so far as they are not exclusively participating in the context-oriented creative phase. It is broadly an opinion that seems to be based on the assumption that creative mode and creative facility are recognised interdependently and therefore when Sthāyī-Bhāva becomes a medium for such an operation, the attendant categories merge into a newer creative fineness. We also understand, relying upon Abhinavagupta's observation, that Bhāva is a proposition that requires context and medium besides appropriate equivalent units and in that way it is a transferable realistic mode of operative knowledge. It is quite an exercise of understanding a distinction between functional creativity and non-functional creativity and Abhinavagupta gives recognition and place to each these:

Creation of Rasa is specific to the actor, environment and audience and when an actor acts for the sake of an audience, the audience perceives it by signifying of an actor as well as the environment, when fact of comprehension becomes unified event for an actor, environment, and the audience, creation of Rasa also becomes imminent.⁹

It is quite clear from the foregoing that Bhāva does not become a limitation to the other constituents. It is more and more a synthesis of emerging facts and emerging attributes of medium, context, environment and the audience. Abhinavagupta is more in favour of unifying the conceptual propositions like Bhāva and less in favour of disintegrating formally or informally the propositions; at the same time Bhāva becomes an objectified equivalent for states of bodily gestures in which gesture is always transformed into its propositional equivalent and when this transformation becomes recognised, event of coalescence of Bhāva comes to be created. Abhinavagupta says:

Various gestures of acting favour a condition of coalescence by various propositional modes and when such an event comes to be recognised Bhāva also comes to be created.¹⁰

Now it becomes possible to consider the functional and non-functional modes of Bhāva. In the functional mode Bhāva is a normative proposition creating perspectives for operative mode of knowledge in which it causes categories to merge and coalesce, and in non-functional mode it becomes a proposition which creates a perspective for equivalent and constitutes a holistic measure for such an equivalence. For example, consider the following:

Daddy I have had to kill you
 You died before I had time
 Marble heavy, a bag full of God,
 Ghastly statue with one grey toe
 Big as Frisco Seal.

(Sylvia Plath, 'Daddy')

The poet is suggesting an impersonal variant for herself. Daddy here is an enlarged and noteworthy occasion who is principally in contrast with the speaker who is primarily out to regulate own term and identity. Through the 'I' an interacted 'you' is created and later made redundant and inoperative. 'You' enriches the strength of operative and functional 'I' conducts an occasion of expression. It is remarkable that both the individualities are parallel to one another; therefore each reopens a venue for itself.

It is precisely an instance of understanding positional variations of the different creative orders through a difference in appropriate medium, context and environment. The way in which we come to call Bhāva a functional normative proposition and non-functional propositional equivalent, is also the way in which we comprehend the significance of constituents and orders. Another approach to understand Bhāva seems to be an under-standing not of Bhāva but of the different phases of correlation and transformation of Bhāva. Mammata advocates the same idea and says:

Of Bhāva, there are (a) 'Allayment', (b) 'manifestation', (c) 'conjecture' and (d) 'admixture'.¹¹

What is important to understand from this is that Bhava is an existence

of a recognised creative position, but the same existence is meaningful only in relation to transformation into the categories and correlation with the constructs. It hardly comes to occupy an important position in Mammata's understanding that Bhāva is not an independent conceptual proposition; rather it is an attendant system. We do not seem to be agreeing with the notion. While on the other hand, we will say that Bhāva is not at all a terminal variation either of transformation or even of correlation because transformation and correlation become techniques in the conceptualisation of Bhāva, nevertheless they never constitute any basis in the concept of Bhāva. Now we will say that Bhāva is basically a normative proposition and propositional equivalent.

Role of Bhāva in establishing simultaneous cognition is now well understood and quite comprehensible and when we ask such questions as how at all Bhāva brings forth cognition for the sake of simultaneity, answers become obvious and clear. In the first place, Bhāva makes creative facts, a form of norm and proposition, and, in the next place, it secures an equivalent for each of the propositions. Anandavardhana agrees with us and says:

Moreover even supposing that Rasa etc can be suggested only by specific senses, a classified treatment of suggestive elements given above would still be useful since specific senses are inseparably connected with suggestive words.¹²

It proposes a comprehensible variety of cognitive levels with an application of Bhāva in the background and when we extend the argument further, we just find that Bhāva, acting as a positional context to a background, brings about exactly the same comprehensibility is understood at once for several categories and constructs. It is not just a resumption of Bhāva; apprehending meaning for the words or words dislocating meanings for Bhāva, rather it is a normative proposition that constitutes a total system for each of the orders of construction. In that way Bhāva nearly performs, the role of a realistic operative mode that draws upon two unified levels and simultaneous cognition becomes an integration of nearly all the formal positions of linguistic, verbal and emotive orders found within a poetical work or even a work of art. It remains to be seen how formal positions integrate and it seems worth our while to attend to such a problem. Integration is distinguished from

transformation and transmutation and even correlation, on the other hand it is reorganisation of word, syllable, letter, sound, *Bhāva* and *Pratibhā* in such a way that words and Rasas become an equivalent proposition realistically entering into a combination for the sake of enrichment and concretisation of the whole work of art. Acceptance of such a position by Anandavardhana is quite obvious, and he not only accepts the idea but approves of the fact of enrichment by making it an enrichment created through transferrable comprehensibility. He says:

The main task of a first rate poet lies in the proper marshalling of whole contents and the expressions in the direction of *Rasa* etc.¹³

It is interesting to learn that transference of comprehensibility is a recreation of ideal position that is most obviously fitted and suited for the words, the letters, the syllables, the sound, the *Bhāvas* and the *Pratibhā*. This becomes a positive orientation while *Bhāva* remains central to the modes of acquiring cognition. This assertion has a basic validity in finding truth that suggestion of *Bhāva* incorporates gradually coalescing constantly transforming, and regularly transmutating facts of a work of art. For instance, look at the following:

What shall I do with this absurdity—
O heart! O troubled heart— this caricature,
Decrepit age that has been tied to me
As to a dog's tail?

(W.B. Yeats. 'The Tower')

Here 'absurdity' is a lack of commitment for the speaker and a temporal sequence in which there is no exposition of concrete self of the poet. *Jugupsā* (disgust) in 'absurdity' is compounded with *Bhaya* (Fear) hidden in 'heart' and 'troubled heart'. All along he performs a mutation of heart to mean further that *Bhaya* (Fear) is now an accepted reality. It is to be seen that the poet keeps on multiplying the transformation by employing such words as 'heart', troubled heart, 'absurdity' and 'caricature'.

Our position develops a need for a suitability that is obvious in the next expanding position and that is why suggestion of *Bhāva* is not at all localised in the simplicity of one category; rather it is dislocated invariably in all the positive and conforming categories. It is now

possible to say that internalised organisation and externalised proposition establish a conditional harmony between a specific status of meaning that emerges and various constructs which primarily follow up the acquisitional phase of variance in structural idealisation. Explanations that we are giving are basic to any valid approach that deals with such a thesis. Anandavardhana's observation and understanding leads us to remarkable point and that is a similar preference of segmented suggestive medium (actor, environment, audience and the text) over one or another in isolation or even individually. Bhāva is broadly a significance of actual harmony that subsists in the major identifications of positions of categories and constructional apparatus and it also validates the recognised synthesis of the same features. In that way simultaneous cognition may have a broad relationship with the identification and synthesis of each and everything that tends to reorganise. Our own position approves of the significance of the same idea. Following observation may well lead us to the same acceptance.

If only the real nature of objects in the world ... is utilised in such a way that it is imbued with *Rasa*, etc. and that is in keeping with the demands of decorum.¹⁴

This is just an affirmation of Bhāva to evoke unificational modes, mediums and models, simultaneously incorporating the regular and approved species of secondary synthetic categories. What becomes clear is the status of cognition and levels of cognition and it is not out of place to remark that Bhāva is a proposed variance that distinguishes Bhāva and *Rasa* in proportion to their logical participation in the process of artistic creation. One of the earliest levels of cognition is that of Bhāva of becoming a normative proposition with transferable comprehensibility of knowledge, and secondly, it is propositional equivalent that also includes transformation, and the like. What in fact emerges as a high point in our estimation of levels of cognition is that the inclusion of transformation and correlation and unification is imminent only at a later stage, never at the beginning of the creation. This makes the phenomenon unique in literary comprehensiveness and understanding. Western critical tradition hardly takes any account of, or even explains, such an event, because by nature, Western critical tradition does not accept the significant propositional correlation and creative order of

reality. It is also remarkable that beginning of the phases of cognition so far as Dhvani system is concerned, as one of its necessary orders, the principal of Bhāva is concerned, is marked with an independence of each of the categories and the independence itself constitutes the inclusive specifications and exclusive notations in the subsequent stages. Abhinavagupta identifies certain conditions in which actuality of an idealised experience becomes a realistic measure. These conditions include heightening of desire, and hatred for something else and the like. The important thing to understand is that Abhinavagupta states what Sthāyī-Bhāva should become and how it must be accepted as such. In one of the observations that precedes this, he explains his position more authentically:

These rasas becomes an object of delight because of self-realisation and because of the feel and experience of such a realisation.¹⁵

This is an estimate of how Bhāva could be understood to be as indicating certain patterns of cognition because self-realisation and delight that ensue from such a realisation, is nothing but the proposition for norm and creation of an equivalent proportion to the necessary requirements. Dhvani, in that way, of necessity, includes such specific instances of harmonisation. The next important stage that comes in the suggestive feature is modelised applicability and that is another higher level of richness and concretisation. The way in which we understand the term, and the way in which the term finds its application is a new facet of the whole Dhvani theory. Model is a notational constituent of formal and functional creative order and that is why model must be made to include the exceptional feature that each of the categories shows for a necessary adaptability, while model necessarily includes notational constituents, the positive features that it gives rise to cannot be denied. Notation is a useful conception of exact synthesis of knowledge and because of this it is more recent as an event in effecting the suitability and comprehensibility of the categories. Modelised applicability, in that way, becomes a creation of suitable and realistic standards in major forms of language, thought, *Pratibhā* and Bhāva. For example, language has syllable, sound, letter and a word and if we want to examine these situations in relation to modelised applicability we will say that syllable has become so effective that it can acquire the comprehension of

signification. If it is asked why it happens, then we will say that syllable is now in a position to bring about a richness and meaningfulness in itself as well as in preceding and succeeding words, aspects of sound and the whole period. In that way development of model must obviously and necessarily include conforming systematisation of the categories and constructs. It is necessary to understand that model in itself is a synthesis of positive conforming conditions of creation and applicability of model is a standardisation and universalisation of the same aspect. Genuine subscription to the idea seems to be recurrent in the works of Rajasekhara who has developed the idea of *Pratibhā* (genius) and makes it an attendant conclusive fixture and says:

Pratibha heightens the significance and adaptability of group of words, species of meaning, the alliterations and beautiful expressions and also brings about an enrichment of the different poetic materials lying within the poet.¹⁶

It represents a well-defined notational perspective and that is the application of a proposition that constitutes a standard of significance in establishing an enriched, unified and regular poetic vision. Dhvani has an application because of this. And now we will say that modalised applicability gives a structural synthesis to the attendant categories; it may be an accepted position whose relevance is significantly specific to development of this. Anandavardhana also gives a due place to such an idea, and says:

Only those instances wherein we find both the word and the meaning solely directed towards the implied meaning should be regarded as real instances of suggestive poetry, admitting of no confusion whatsoever.¹⁷

The actual position that comes out of this must be a calculative assimilation that generally presents a significance because of creative construct and a significance that it derives from similar creative construct and in that way it becomes easier to understand that it is only significance of interdependence in the background of contextualised transformation that really presents a perspective for creation. It now seems that model achieves the status of model in so far as it succeeds in acquiring an interdependence or significance of transformation and it is justly a constitution of minor and major creative constituents which neither

oppose nor balance the cognition facility; rather they transfer and transform the differing levels of cognition. It gives rise to another problem, i.e., how should a model be understood to be performing the act of transformation and transfer of contentive modes while it never opposes or balances the enrichment or the meaning that lies as a rule in any responding category. We would like to defend our position by saying that Dhvani in itself deals with the phases of variation in the meaningfulness of creative order of reality. This creates concrete perspectives in which norms become conceptual frames of cognition and what was earlier a normative standard, now becomes a synthesis of cognitive patterns. In that way, Dhvani becomes an implicational orientation of early and later phases of synthesis of categories. That is why, fact of balancing and fact of opposition of creative tendencies is in proportion to the levels of cognition doesn't find any noticeable recognition and even identification in Dhvani system. Anandavardhana exactly gives a support to this:

Only that wherein all the several beautifiers of the expressed sense and the expression exists with the single purpose of conveying Rasa and so on is to be regarded as coming under the scope of suggestion.¹⁸

It brings to ourselves an important fact that Dhvani is not at all a system of derivation of either attendant or even inhering categories and constructs, rather it is a factual transformation that comes out of an effective synthesis. In the background of such an argument we can say that transformation and synthesis brought about by correlation of proposition and standardisation of norms become one of the central tendencies in Dhvani. The question still remains as to how a model working in a system like that is expected to bring about such facilities and having brought them about, becomes in itself an application for the sake of such an exercise? Our position, in the first place, is that the whole Dhvani system has factual tendencies transformation and synthesis of the, models that creates response and adaptability. Another aspect of the same problem will be to consider the technique and the processes that are involved in the same. When we come to consider the technique of applicability of models in Dhvani, we come to begin with both minor and major units and we identify the words, the meaning the sound, Bhāva and Rasa. Each of these, as our position states, is designated and

idealised codes that has an effect of proportion and standardisation. For example, models that we have in a word is, in fact, a suitable association and enriched variation, suitability of association is acquired on account of a developed contextual response and adequate coalescence of referential and denotative standards. And in that way does the model work. Simultaneously for creative enrichment and also for encoding of positive correlation which become standards. Abhinavagupta's observations point out validity of our argument:

word and meaning become body of a work of art. The fact is a standard that must be accepted. the significance of word and the significance of meaning constitute a sensible point of elegance and charm for the sake, both of word and meaning, become, in fact, a foundation for Dhvani. Elegance and charm is either because of its form or because of its constitution. Hence words become significant because of the alliteration affecting their form while meaning becomes significant because of an effect of similar scale altering the constitution.¹⁹

Dhvani must be understood in relation to such. Word as a form and model in the background of Abhinavagupta's observations must become constitutionally and formalistically significant simultaneously for the sake of each of these. The difference that this element of signification creates is proportional to the discursive reliability that comes out of the difference. In that way, model of word creates a basic point of understanding and explanation. In the first place, it is total in creating the difference of discursive totality and simultaneously constituting a proportional variation in the cognitive assimilation and amalgamation. In view of this, we will now say that the word that creates specific point of interdependence is cognitively a primary factor in standardising the significant proportion of the categories and, secondly, it is a secondary fact in universalising the enriched appearances. Consider the following:

What dwelling shall receive me?
in what vale shall be my harbour?
underneath what grove shall I take up my home?
And what sweet stream shall with
its murmur lull me to my rest.

(William Wordsworth, *Prelude*, Book 1)

Here the poet opts for a resolution with a suggested relocation of the

words. For example 'what dwelling shall receive me?' has been redefined on a tertiary level by eloping the word 'What'. It is to be understood that 'what' and 'shall' both undergo elopement and become mutually compatible. When the intensity of experience becomes high the mutual transformation of 'what' and 'shall' takes place. Kuntaka favours our position and states:

In a work of art, status of word is acquired on account of having appropriately constituted out of just artistic materials. It is also an ability to become significant individually and hence to suggest that essential meaning individually and on its own. If such is the point and height of excellence, construct becomes word in any work of art.²⁰

Kuntaka's observations are remarkable in asserting the modelised perspective of word and it develops the argument that model of a word could only be a model if it individually presents the fact of constitution of artistic materials and, because of this, it becomes a status of specific notions. Now we will modify our position in order to include such a fine remark and we will say that model of a word must be specific to each of the cases of signification, transformation, and proportion while it should simultaneously effect the enrichment by establishing the phases of correlation and interdependence. This is a point of essential achievement of Dhvani system. It is not that the status of model doesn't have any shortcoming or imperfections. Mahimabhatta in his *Vyaktiviveka* rejects the modelised applicability of almost all the categories and constructs in Dhvani:

Words only display the aspect of signification because of their inherent tendencies, not because of anything else. It stands that the word 'Ghat', when it comes to signify what is appropriate, it is because of its tendency that it incorporate the actions that are attendant upon 'Ghatri', they never tend to incorporate tendencies of Ghatava species of community.²¹

While we are advocating the case of models of Dhvani and their applicability, Mahimabhatta is just rejecting the notions and it leaves an important question with us and that is the order and relativity of the importance of point of signification and the respect of referential denotation. In Dhvani system, the point of signification and referential

denotation exist independently of one another and there is hardly any semblance between the enrichment of denotation and enrichment of the point of signification. Enrichment of denotation is a capability that terminates at the beginning of first phase of transformation while point of signification merely transforms and transmutes the responding and unresponding phases of variations in the process of enrichment. Because of this, it is not only difficult to accept Mahimabhatta's observations but it is impracticable also. We may argue that the word, while acquiring the status of a model necessarily denotes suggestive meaning and transforms both the fact of signification and referential standards and that is why it is always operational in each of the phases of variation in the process of enrichment. It is because of that Mahimabhatta's observations do not stand to our theoretical position and the outright rejection of the phased enrichment of creative categories as it comes to take place in Dhvani system, is also our cause of concern. In one of his observations Mahimabhatta states:

suggested construct which is set to acquire contextual adequacy is neither obvious nor justified. what becomes important is the enriched construct which appears to be so because medium of the means which bring forth such a state, is always — responsive and subordinate to the end, appearing enriched construct is more a cause of wonder than suggestion.²²

What we understand from this is that the enrichment is acceptable only if it has the status of *Pratīyamāna*. And the same order of adequacy is representatively more near to perfect artistic constitution but it remains to be seen in what way Dhvani becomes less recognisable and less authentic than *Pratīyamāna*. Still, fact remains that the word, of necessity, becomes a model and opens up scope for an applicability. Mahimabhatta's denial of such a position also at the same time becomes our acceptance:

Meaning is of two kinds *Vācya* and *Anumeya*. Meaning that comes out of the power of the word becomes *Vācya* and what comes out of the suggested is what is to be understood as *Anumeya*. It is recognised in three different forms, *Vastu*, *Alaṅkāra* and *Rasa*, while the former two constructs may be having the status of suggestion only, *Rasa* is only out and out *Anumeya*. It is essentially the presence

of means and end that also determine the presence of Anumeya in any category and construct.²³

It could be seen that Mahimabhatta opens up the tertiary level of signification and enrichment of the categories and while doing so he recognises the fact that the ideal signification is a specific status of enriched proportions in which object is more nearly a form of Rasa. In view of this, model of a word would be a model for the sake of an acquisition and creation of the same specific status of idealised proportions in terms of creative enrichment and categorical discursion. Now we will say that the word becomes model and creates standards for its applicability by virtue of being transformably, independent and individual and in each of these, the effective constitution is brought about by maximum artistic contents and materials. This may be a numerical conceptualisation. Take the following:

Fool! All that is, at all
Lasts ever, past recall;
Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand
sure:
What entered into thee
That was, is, and shall be / Times wheel
runs back or stop:
Potter and clay endure.

(Robert Browning, 'Rabbi Ben Ezra')

In this Robert Browning creates several primary models in the form of words. For example, 'Soul', 'God', 'Time', 'Wheel', 'Potter' and 'Clay' and every other primary model are in exact correspondence with secondary situation attained in Fool! All that is at all / What entered into thee / that was, is and shall be. The poet multiplies the equivalences and creates a value. For instance, generic words like *all that is at all/ what entered into thee*, enrich idea of God's permanence and men's impermanence by reinforcing proto-generic metaphors in potter, clay, wheel, time, soul and god.

IV

Structures in Dhvani numerically become creative positions because they are not only constitutionally significative, but also they include almost

an imaginative status of creative categories and standardisation of operative mode of knowledge of the responding and unresponding categories. It could also be stated that the Western criticism and European perspective of English criticism rarely takes an account of such a position, for example, Aristotle states in his *Poetics*:

The instinct of imagination is implanted in childhood. ... We have evidence of this in the facts of experience. ... We delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity. ... Imitation then is one instinct of our nature.²⁴

What Aristotle is trying to let us know, is that the segmentation of creative medium like the original object, the artist and the transformed object, and the enrichment that has come out of it is neither exclusive nor inclusive for the sake of synthesis and transformation; rather, it is ordinary in enriching the creative construct because the numerical proposition of the categories is recognised to be artistic in some and unartistic in the others. This creates what we would like to call 'denial' of a necessary enrichment in terms of proportional signification and this could be seen in each of the critical theories of Western tradition. Another obvious example seems to be that of Jacques Derrida (1991: 18) who formulates the following problem:

If totalization no longer has any meaning, is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by finite glance or a finite discourse but because the nature of the field ... that is, language and finite language ... excludes totalization ... one cannot determine the centre or exhaust totalization because the sign which replaces the centre which supplements it, taking centre's place in its absence ... this sign is added the movement of signification ... is a floating one because it comes to perform vicarious formations, to supplement a lack on the part of the signified.²⁵

The same problem could be seen to be besetting Derrida's ideas. He makes centre, totalization and signification mutually inoperative and inexclusive phases of meaning and while totalization and centre are derived and in approved varieties of enrichment, signification acts more

of having artistic constituents and in that way acceptance of proportional enrichment could be a near impossibility. This cannot be accepted as truth of this is more broadly and more fundamentally stated in Dhvani system. Each of the categories enters into a harmonious interrelationship and harmony itself is a fact of exclusion of localisation and in that way it becomes broadening of universal proportion in the categories. The effect that comes out of that is simultaneous interdependence, independence and the like. The implication of this could be very well understood by accepting the proposition that Dhvani is an acceptance of actual creative standards as it comes to be developed by word, sound, letter, syllable, the sentence and the like, it is because of this that Anandavardhana observes:

only those contexts where Rasa are made known by the descriptions of the situational stimuli, responses and the passing moods which are themselves expressed by so many words will serve as proper instances of this suggestions. ²⁶

This is enough to express the conclusion that the process of enrichment must remain proportionally exclusive in all of the categories and while this process is getting along transformation and transmutation must adequately represent the phases of synthesis. This is what is not found in the Western criticism, as we have seen in Aristotle's and Derrida's observations indicating the similar positions. For example, the reality of the situation is evident in these verses:

Lady, three white leopards sat under a juniper tree
In the cool of the day, having fed to satiety
On my legs, my heart, my liver
and that which had been contained
In the hollow round of my skull. -

(T.S. Eliot, *Ash Wednesday*, II)

Eliot adopts a method of composing synthesis at transformational events. Expansion of antithesis (three white leopards sat under a juniper tree) comes to a close in reduction of proposition (that which had been contained in the hollow round of skull).

Another obvious model must be that of meaning, in Dhvani system,

is condition of order and creative reality. It is an aspect of presentative ability of the modificational phases of artistic convergence. An approach to model of meaning is cumulation of artistic coherence systematised in broadly two facts. In the first place, minor artistic units like poetic fancy and the like on the one hand, and on the other hand major artistic units like metaphor and simile, create necessary presentative medium in which expository enrichment universalises the localised denotative and referential positions. In that way modelised meaning is necessarily an instance of modificational synthesis and we cannot say that it is an existence apart from every phase of newness rather it is presentative and expository in each of the conditions of universal creative order. Anandavardhana has outlined suggested metaphor, suggested similes, suggested poetic fancy to be constituting core of the structures outlined in presentative and expository synthesis. Suggested metaphor and suggested simile become significant because of internal artistic coherence, and hence they create conditions of meaningfulness without any direct recourse to inhering construct. Kuntaka approves of the idea and states :

Only that meaning could be recognised which devises the aspect of delight and fulfilment in the artistic bent of *sahryadya*. Delight of *sahryadya* is an order of perception which comprehends universality.²⁷

Kuntaka is here comprehending the existence and creation of meaning as a condition of fulfilment of *Sahrydaya*, therefore two levels of modelised meaning could at once be recognised. The first level is the level of exposition, and the second level is that of synthesis.

It is now an acceptable fact that exposition in synthesis substantially present a formalistic order for meaning and create the required degree of proportion. Thus the acceptability increases in proportion to the development of exposition and synthesis. It is at this stage that the primary assumption become positive shades of transition between enrichment oriented positivisation and newness of specific notional perspectives. Precisely the appearance of model could be understood as having transition at the beginning of exposition and synthesis at the culmination such a transition. Kuntaka's observations exactly point to such a deduction and what he means is that the first phase of transition begins with exposition itself and the final phase is reached with synthesis in the form of delight of *Sahrydaya*. We can also examine the fact as

receptive to presentative abilities of any linguistic model, of course, the events of language do not always give a scope for such an analysis. The issues have corresponding application in Aeschylus's *Prometheus Bound*:

What! What's this? What may be this resulting stir I here again hardly
 offend? the air when with the light rush of pinion.

(Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*)

In these verses, Aeschylus constructs an order for comprehension *light rush of pinion* puts forth a necessity to restore freedom as an essential meaning while *rustling stir* opens a continuum for it. It is to be seen that all the words belong to expanding category therefore they finally converge on the same situation.

We will now say that modelised meaning must be a standardised secondary derivative of synthesised exposition. It places certain important conditions at the beginning of any meaningful discourse. Abhinavagupta has stated that beginning of any exposition and end of the same synthesis eventually create meaning that comes to be accepted as Dhvani, he says:

Power of Abhidha is a time specific event indicating a scope for the suggested meaning. The secondary perspective that goes along with this is the power of Tātparya. And Lakṣaṇā is distinguished from these in so far as it brings about an awareness of meaning. These three constructs together purify with the help of pratibhā what comes to be a new shade of meaning, is what is Dhvani.²⁸

It is absolutely clear from the foregoing that meaning is a formal appearance of an objective proposition understood in the construction of holistic transformative position. This position is unquestionably evident in

Farewell the tranquil mind! O now forever Farewell content!
 Farewell the plumed troops and big wars
 That make ambition virtue! O, farewell!
 Farewell the neighing steed and the shrill trump,
 The port stirring rum, the ear piercing fife
 The pomp and circumstances of glorious war!

(Shakespeare, *Othello*)

Othello is here distributing correlated proportions of diminished experience to functionally intense words. Occurrence of 'Farewell' as an equivalent unit suggests the possibility of extra-reversibility.

We will now say that the distribution of Lakṣaṇā, Abhidhā and Tātparya also indicates the necessary categorical union and synthesis. Development on this scale becomes the main attribute for conclusive functions. Meaning in the same way, determines the equivalent conditions for ordinary as well as significant systems. We may now say that model of meaning presents its applicability in certain specific ways. In one of the ways, it becomes notional conditions and in another, it is poised between exposition and synthesis. When we come to speak of meaning becoming suggestive fact by the way of transforming categories and constructs. Another broad perspective that seems to be well emerging is that of Mammata's ideas which are nearly novel in stating that element of cognition is very much there while transformation of meaning is underway. This cognition is another higher state in the development of the levels of transition. While exposition and synthesis constitute elementary levels of transformative discourse, cognition as outlined by Mammata, becomes secondary level of transmutational discourse. In these two states what is important to understand and know, is that both the categories, constructs and words themselves create realistic mediums and apprehend dislocational mutation of meaning. This is quite remarkable and it systematises every perspective of model of meaning. We would like to return to Mammata once again for approval and affirmation:

Suggestion is that function of the meaning which brings about the cognition of another meaning, by persons endowed with imaginative intuition ... through peculiarities of (a) the speaker (b) the person spoken to (c) intonation (d) the sentence (e) the expressed meaning (f) the presence of another (g) context (h) play (i) time and so forth.²⁹

This position is quite acceptable and as it develops modes of discourse positively for the sake of translation and transmutation and on the elementary level this process necessarily incorporates the rich artistic, linguistic, verbal, and emotive conditions. S.K. De, is, however, quite unwilling to accept this and says:

One of the fundamental problems of Sanskrit poetics ... is the problem of context and expression of poetry ... the Sabda and Artha.

word and sense, of technically the *vacak* and *vacya*, the expresser and the expressed, had already been distinguished by grammatical and philosophical speculation as the medium of linguistic expression.¹⁰

This is quite unacceptable and we will have to reject De's assertions and we will say that it is only *Dhvani* which gives a full scope for both content and expression. As we have been arguing, the content is a provisional synthesis of the categories while the expression enriches the modificational and transformative mediums. In the first instance, enrichment of modificational and transformative mediums is intended as well as realistic. For example, emerging suggested figure does necessarily come out of exaction of which in turn is correlatively idealised by equally specific categories. In each of the stages, what, in fact, we find is permanent and absolute proportion of emotive as well as verbal and linguistic mediums and it is because of this that *Dhvani* is harmony of content and expression, we are favouring a position that doesn't substantially alter existing interpretations rather we are supplementing it by newer, theoretical assumptions. It is generally nature of meaning to intend and incorporate synthesis and also crucially create orders of creative reality. Patanjali has obviously understood the significance of such as assertion and states:

Universal applicability of meaning binds itself to usage of words and conventions of tradition.¹¹

In that way it is, of necessity, that we accept the existence of model of meaning broadly on two considerations, firstly, meaning creates that empirical order of creativity in which applicatory intention is more obvious than intentional conformity. In the next place, it also distributes the universal presentative facts founded upon exposition of transformation and transmutation of synthesis. Such is our point of view and we still maintain that *Dhvani* is remarkable because of the structures of signification that it creates and these two structures namely simultaneous cognition and modelised applicability remain basic to any good understanding of *Dhvani*.

V

The third model that we would like to present is that of *Rasa* itself.

and in this, we will state how Rasa constitutes core of the model of the meaning. Rasa is the specific status of idealised proportional correlation of the creative categories. Specific idealised, proportional and correlation constitute the realtive conceptual orders, and, in themselves, become formal integrative phases of compulsory discursion. At the beginning, it is necessary to understand the significative modes contained in different structures which constitute core of Rasa. Excitant, Ensuant,³² Transitory emotion and Permanent emotion are recognised to be simultaneous significative levels. Ensuaunts, the manifestation of the Bhāva, creates an immediacy both in terms of response to the factors and the attributes of the universe as well as to the immediate medium. In that way, it is local to the medium while being universal to the creative environment. Localisation of immediate medium breaks the creative constituents into Ālambana and Uddipana and each of these becomes a way to enrich the medium itself. That is how we understand the creation of first significant order by break of creative constituents and for the sake of reorganisation. It also establishes genuine harmony between external phases of disorganisation and internal variations in the differing modes of creative constructs. What, in fact, comes to us is retention of immediate response and organisation of creative immediacy and what comes to be created is immediate significative phase. This phase remains localised in two perspectives. The first is an approach of immediacy that goes on reconstituting and recreating the creative terminations which could have been more of possibility. It is because of that, we will say, Ensuant begins localised signification in that it reorganises and restores immediacy of an immediate creative environment and internalises factors and attributes of the universe. K.C. Pandey (1950 : 15) has interpreted Ensuant as "the dramatic situation, which is not the cause but only a medium, through which emotion arises in the actor ... Vibhāva is so called, because it arouses emotions in a manner quite different from that, in which emotion arises in "actual life."³³ In this, the important point is the fact that ensuant is a medium and beyond that we do not find ourselves to be in agreement with the author. We will persist in believing that ensuant is localised significative order restoring the immediacy and internalising the universal. Abhinavagupta favours and advocates such an opinion:

In dramatic representation, what comes to make realisation possible by becoming a cause for such a possibility and such a realisation, is in fact, what we understood as Vibhāva.¹⁴

Abhinavagupta is trying to explain the immediacy of immediate environment, i.e., the dramatic presentation and obvious necessity to reorganise the factors of universalised creative medium by standardising a necessary cause in the form of variations of enrichment. The facts of Instant could also be presented as having acquired adoptive facility in that it uniformly restores and reorganises differential indeterminate positions. Anubhāva (Excitant) is a fixed notional category of internal formation and reappearance of the same formation as external proposition. Internal formation is constitutively a recognisable synthesis produced by the objects and factors operating in the different creative mediums. It is operatively a determinacy of different functional modes that begin the process of enrichment in the internal construct and recreate the same constructional apparatuses in the external medium. We understand that the inclusion of concrete perceptual devices as modes of enrichment in the formation of Anubhāva (Excitant) is, in fact, the reorganisation of localised signification and externalisation of the same order. Thus Anubhāva creates another positional variation in communicating enriched proportion to the external medium in that it substantially changes the major and the minor creative units. It is in that way, another order in structuring the signification. Visvanath's observations point to exactly this because he considers Anubhāva to be an object of proposition which is internally sustained and internally constituted creating standards for recognised creative status of the formal appearance of the fact of internal constitution and internal sustenance really gives a scope for such an understanding and in that way we will now state that Anubhāva presents another remarkable position of signification. S.K. De observes of Anubhāva as that which makes the 'permanent mood actually sensed'. It is very difficult to approve of De's assertion, in view of our own theoretical assumption on certain logical grounds. Firstly "actually sensed" becomes a vague proposition because it does not expand the scope of Anubhāva as being structurally identified order of meaning and mode of signification by becoming internal formation of the functional objects and constructs. In the next place, these functional objects and constructs in themselves create what we would like to call internalised

significant apparatus. It is also a point of observation in the conceptual understanding of Vibhāva that it presents a mode of inter-signification by operationalising the same constituents. As a result of this, certain medium-specific objects emerge which create an explanation for such a perspective. The whole concept is so well illustrated in the following verses of Wordsworth:

The city now doth like a garment
wear the beauty of the morning.

(Wordsworth, 'Sonnet Composed upon Westminster Bridge')

The poet is comprehending aahlad (wear) in that he is in a position to distinguish Anubhāva (city, garment) and Vibhāva (beauty, moments). One could well see how the effect of cohesion (now, like) improvises and prefixes coordinates of transformation (garment, wear, beauty, morning) Wordsworth constructs modals in each. Sthāyī-Bhāva is an exceptional numerical synthesis of concrete creative constructs acting as modes in formal instances only and whose informal position of is significantly reduced. Sthāyī-Bhāva, in that way, becomes a location of ideal creative instances more as a cause and less as an effect. It must be understood that the word 'permanent' as it usefully comes to be applied to Sthāyī-Bhāva is hardly substantial for any purpose. We will say that Sthāyī-Bhāva is numerical synthesis of ideal creative instances and this appears to be a good explanation and it leads to certain important assumptions. One of which is that Sthāyī-Bhāva becomes a frame of reference for balancing the opposing creative categories. Thus, conceptually, it recreates the positive and negative numerical positions of the categories. The objects that come out of such a phenomenon are context-specific and naturalised for the sake of medium. The significant perspective of Sthāyī-Bhāva could very well be understood as numerical in creating standards of synthesis and becoming formal instances when context of the objects are specified in the participating creative medium. Visvanatha observes of Sthāyī-Bhāva:

That original state of experience which is neither to be made to disappear by positive emotions, nor to be rendered so by negative emotions is known as Sthāyī-Bhāva. It can never be replaced by any other state of mind, at most it can only be added to or supplemented by others.³⁵

It could be seen that Viśvanātha gives a due place to the fact that Sthāyī-Bhāva is a fixed status of an idealised creative perspective; it is because of that it becomes numerical procedure for enriching and harmonising the attendant verbal and emotive units. The fact is now established and we will also make a record of that. Sthāyī-Bhāva is that order of signification in which both the local and universal instances find a proportionally enriched variation and it makes universal to coalesce into local experiential creative order. While Viśvanātha approves of numerical proposition of Sthāyī-Bhāva, Abhinavagupta³⁶ slightly expands the scope of such an idea by making Sthāyī-Bhāva to be expressive of single significative order, in that it is formally and informally instanced for the sake of structure of Bhāva, contents of experience, and proportion of creativity on the whole.

Mark but this flea and mark in this
How little that which thou deny'st me is
It sucked me first and now sucks her and now sucks thee
And in this flea, our two bloods mingled be.

(John Donne, 'The Flea')

Donne commits Erotic (Flea) to a sincere manifestation in Sambhoga ('It sucked me first and now sucks her'). 'Flea' operates as a constituent to Universality ('our two bloods mingled be').

In view of this Abhinavagupta further states that it is because of Sthāyī-Bhāva that Rasa becomes an idealisation of universally significant creative contents. It is now possible to understand how Sthāyī-Bhāva is a system of creating objects of total meaning and enrichment. Our understanding is substantiated by yet another position taken by Abhinavagupta that Sthāyī-Bhāva appears only in the form of meaning and realisation of such a meaning. It is now conclusively understood that Sthāyī-Bhāva is creative of objects, proportion and order of meaning in the first place and signification in the second place.

VI

Dhvani, in that way, becomes an approach to systematise a definite pattern of cognition, correlation, transformation, application of the categories like Rasa, Bhāva, Sthāyī-Bhāva, Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Sañcārī Bhāva and primary creative models like words, letters, syllables

and the sentence on the whole. Cognition produces enriched and idealised categories which restore a sensible equilibrium of artistic contents in Bhâva and other applicatory categories. Application of the genuine primary models in the form of syllables, words, letters and sentence and the like create harmony and construct a state of newness while positional changes substantially alter and internalise the synthesised artistic contents in the artistic medium, artistic environment and artistic object. Transformation, in the last place, constitutes universality of artistic enrichment on internal and external levels of the creativity. In Dhvani system of Indian poetics, the principles of creativity are comprehended in a way and in a manner in which Western literary theories only provide an insignificant and inconclusive understanding of the problems of artistry.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1. Mammata, *Kāvya-Prakāśa*: 41.

Mammata in his *Kāvya-Prakāśa* has expanded the scope of the concept of Dhvani by introducing 'cognition' into it:

वक्तृबोद्धव्यकाकूनांवाक्यवाच्यान्यसन्निधेः ॥ 21 ॥

प्रस्तावदेशकालादेवै शिष्टद्यात प्रतिभानुषाम ।

यर्थस्यान्यार्थ धी हेतुर्व्यापारो व्यक्तिरेव सा ॥ 22 ॥

See *Kāvya-Prakāśa of Mammata*, Trans. & Ed. Ganganath Jha. New Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

2. Aspect of conceptualisation comes into as a necessary corollary to the 'cognition' that exists as a rule in Dhvani. A general subscription to the idea is recurrent in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, for example, we have रसभावतदाभासतत्प्रशान्त्यादिरक्रमः ।

ध्वनेरात्मांगिभावेन भासमानो व्यवस्थितः ॥

Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*: II, 3.

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana*, Trans. & Ed. K. Krishnamoorthy. New Delhi: Motilal Banarasis.

3. Mammata emphasises that suggestive aspect of word and says that it emerges by the necessary suppression of denotative ability.

अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।

संयोगाद्यैरवाच्यार्थधीकृद्भयापृतिं जनम ॥

Mammata, *Kāvya-Prakāśa*: 19.

See *Kāvya-Prakāśa of Mammata*, Trans. & Ed. Ganganath Jha. New Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

4. Abhinavagupta develops a thesis that a word is significant only in relation to the larger fact that it gives rise to.

शब्दार्थशरीरं काव्यामिति यदुक्तं, तत्रा शरीरग्रहणादेव केनचिदात्मना तदनुप्राणकेन भाव्यमेव ।

See *Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta*, Trans. & Ed. Acarya Viśveśvara. New Delhi: University of Delhi Press.

5. Ānandvardhana agrees to the idea and writes, Ānandvardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*: 86, 114.

प्रौढोक्तिमात्रनिष्पन्नशरीरः सम्भवी स्वतः ।

अर्थोपि द्विविधो ज्ञेयो वस्तुनोन्यस्य दीपकः ॥ 24 ॥ (II, 24)

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.

6. शबौ सरफसंयोगो ढकारश्चापि भूयसा ।

विरोधिनः स्युःशृंगारे ते न वर्णाः रसश्च्युतः ॥ 3 ॥

त एव निवेश्यन्ते वीभत्सादौ रसे यदा ॥

तदा तं दीपयन्तयेव तेन वर्णाः रसश्च्युतः ॥ 4 ॥

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.

7. Ānandvardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*: 52.

समर्पकत्वं काव्यस्य यत्तु सर्वरसान प्रति ।

स प्रसादो गुणो ज्ञेयः सर्वसाधारणक्रियः ॥ 10 ॥

Internalization of Bhāva is a restoration of positional variation and also a location of concrete distribution of conforming categories. Restoration and location, in a way, deal with the necessary extension of the phases of organisation. For Bharata, internalisation is a stage in the proper equivalence while larger fact intends as such.

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.

8. Abhinavagupta slightly modifies the explanation by saying that internalised position of Bhāva is, in fact, an order in the synthesis of creative environment adopted externally as Vibhāva and internally in the form of Sthāyī Bhāva. See for further discussion, *Abhinavabhāratī* : 433-39.

See *Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta*, op. cit.

9. *Abhinavabhāratī*: 489.

अयमत्र संक्षेप ... रोमांयादयश्चभूयसा रतिप्रतीतिकारितया दृष्टास्तथापि लौकिकदेशकालनियमेन तत्र रतिं गमयन्ति । यस्यां स्वात्मापि तदाःसनावत्वादनुप्रविष्ट

... तेन साधारणीभूता संतानवृत्तेरेकस्या एव वा संविदी गोचर भूता रतिः श्रृंगारः
साधारणीभावना च विभावाद्धिभिरिति ।

See *Abhinavabhārati of Abhivangupta*, op. cit.

10. *Abhinavabhārati*, p. 512.

भावशब्दार्थपर्यालोचनया चैतदेवोपपन्नामिति श्लोकेनाह्नानाभिनयैः सम्यगबद्धान
हृदयंगतां भावयन्ति संपादयन्ति रसांस्तस्माद् भावाः ॥ 3 ॥

See *Abhinavabhārati of Abhivangupta*, op. cit.

11. भावस्य शान्तिरूदयः संध सबलता तया ॥ 36 ॥ ('काव्यप्रकाश' 4 : 73)

See *Kāvya-Prakāśa of Mammaṭa*, op. cit.

12. Ānandvardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*: III.

किंचार्थ विशेषाक्षेप्यत्वेऽपि रसादीनां तेषामर्थविशेषाणां व्यञ्जकशब्दाविनाभावित्वाद्याथा
प्रदर्शितम् व्यञ्जकस्वरूपपरिज्ञानम् विभज्योपयुज्यत एव । शब्दविशेषाणाम् चान्यात्र
च चारुत्वम् प्रदर्शितम् तदपि तेषामेव व्यञ्जकत्वेनैवावस्थितमित्यवगन्तव्यम् ।

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.

13. *Dhvanyāloka*: 32-33.

वाच्यानां वाचकानां च यदौचित्येन योजनम् ।

रसादिविषयेर्णेतत्कर्म मुख्यं महाकवेः ॥ 32 ॥

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.

14. *Dhvanyāloka*: 202.

रसभावादिसंबन्धा यद्यौ चिन्त्यानुसारणी ।

अन्वीयते वस्तुरगतिदेशकालार्दिभेदिनी ॥ 9 ॥

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.

15. *Abhinavagupta, Abhinavabhārati*: 478, VI.

भाव सर्वेभि सुख प्रधानाः ।

स्वसंविच्चवर्णारूपस्यस्यैकघनस्य प्रकाशाभ्यानन्द सात्वात् ॥

See *Abhinavabhārati of Abhivangupta*, op. cit.

16. Rājasekhara, *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*: 27

या शब्दग्रामर्थसार्थमलंकारतंत्रमुक्तिमार्गमन्यदपि तथाविधमधिहृदसम् प्रतिभासयति
सा प्रतिभा ।

See *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā of Rājasekhara*, Trans. & Ed. Pandit Kedarnath Sharma,
Patna: Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad.

17. Ānandvardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*: 26.

तत्परावेव शब्दार्थे यत्र व्यञ्ज्य प्रतिस्थितौ ।

ध्वनेः स एव विषयोऽन्तव्यः संकरोज्झिमतः ॥ 31 ॥

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.

18. *Dhvanyāloka*: 42.

नाच्यमाचकचारुत्वहेतुनां विविधात्मनाम् ।
(सादिपरता यत्रा स ध्वनेर्विषयो मतः ॥

See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana*, op. cit.

19. *Abhinavagupta, Locana*: 18.

तानेव क्रमेणाह— शब्दार्थशरीरं ताविदत्यादिना । तावद्ग्रहणेन कस्याप्यत्रन विप्रतिपत्तिरिति दर्शयति । तत्रा शब्दार्थो न तावद् ध्वनिः, यतः संज्ञामात्रेण हि को गुणः अथ शब्दार्थयोश्चारुत्वं स ध्वनिः ।

See *Abhinavabhārati of Abhinavagupta*, op. cit.

20. *Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvitam*: 35.

स शब्दः काव्ये यस्तत्समुचितसमस्तसामग्रीकः । कीदृक विवक्षितार्थैकवाचकः । विवक्षितो योऽसौ वक्तुमिष्टोर्थस्तदेक वाचक स्तस्यैकः केवल एव वाचकः । कथम्— अन्येषु सत्स्वपि । अपरेषु तद्वाचकेषु बहुष्वपि वद्विमानेषु । तथा च—

See *Vakroktijīvitam of Kuntaka*, Trans. & Ed. Radhey Shyam Mishra. Varanasi: Chowkhambha Sanskrit Sansthan.

21. *Mahimabhatta, Vyaktiviveka*: 30.

केचित पुनरेषां क्रियेवैका प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति क्रियाशब्दत्वमेव सर्वेषां नामपदानामुपगच्छन्ति । तथा हि—घटादिशब्दाः स्वार्थे प्रवर्तमाना घटनादिक्रियामेवान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभावेनावलम्बमाना दृश्यन्ते । न घटत्वादिसामान्यम् ।

See *Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta*, Trans. & Ed. Pandit Rewa Prasad Dwivedi. Varanasi: Chowkhambha Sanskrit Sansthan.

22. *Vyaktiviveka*: 14.

वाच्यस्य प्रतीयमानापेक्षया चारुत्वनिमित्तं प्राधान्यं व्यभिचारः । तत्र सत्यपि तस्य व्यावृत्त्यर्थं विशेषणमयुक्तं निष्फलत्वाद् यतो यत्रा गुणीभूतव्यंग्ये ये व्यंग्यापेक्षया वाच्यास्य चारुत्वं तदहि व्यावर्तनीयम् ।

See *Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta*, op. cit.

23. *Vyaktiviveka*: 47

अर्थोऽपि द्विविधो वाच्योनुमेश्वरः । तत्रा शब्दव्यापारविषयो वाच्यः । स एव मुख्य उच्यते । यदाहुः— तत एव तदनुमिताद्वा लिंग भूताद्यदमर्थान्तरमनुमोयतेसोनुमेय । स च त्रिविधः वस्तुमात्रामलंकारा रसादयश्चेति । तत्राद्यौ वाच्यावपि सम्भवतः । अन्यस्त्वनुमेय एवेति तत्रा पदस्यार्थो वाच्य एवं नानुमेयः, तस्य निरंशत्वात् साध्यसाधन भावाभावतः ।

See *Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta*, op. cit.

24. *Poetics*: 15. See *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* with a commentary by S.H. Butcher. Indian Reprint. Ludhiyana: Kalyani Publishers.
25. Jacques Derrida: 18. See *Writing and Difference*, London: Routhledge & Kegan Paul, 1991.
26. *Ānandvardhana, Dhvanyāloka*: 84.
न चायमलक्ष्यक्रमव्यंगस्यैव ध्वनेर्विषयः । यतो यत्र साक्षाच्छब्दनिवेदितेभ्यो विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभ्यो रसादीनां प्रतीतिः, स तस्य केवलस्य मार्गः ।
See *Dhvanyāloka of Ānandvardhana*, op. cit.
27. Kuntaka. *Vakroktijīvitam*: 41.
अर्थ वाच्यलक्षणः कीदृशः— काव्ये य सहृदयाणादकारिस्वस्पन्दसुन्दरः । सहृदयाः काव्यार्थविदास्तेषामाह्लादमानन्द करोति यस्तेन स्वरूपन्देनात्मीयेन स्वभावेन सुन्दरः सुकुमारः ।
See *Vakroktijīvitam of Kuntaka*, op. cit.
28. Abhinavagupta, *Locana*: 60-61.
मुख्यार्थबाधादिसहकार्यपेक्षार्थप्रतिभास नशक्तिर्लक्षणाशक्तिः । तच्छक्तित्रयोपज्जिनितार्था-वगममूलजाततत्प्रतिभास पवित्रितप्रतिभासहायार्थद्योतनशक्तिर्ध्वननव्यापारः, ष च प्राग्वृतं व्यापारत्रयं न्यक्कुर्वन्प्रधानभूतः काव्यात्मेत्याशायने निषेध प्रमुखतया च प्रयोजन विषयोपि निषेध विषय इत्युक्तम् ।
See *Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta*, op. cit.
29. Mammata, *Kāvya-Prakāśa*: 40.
वक्तृबोद्धव्यकाकूनां वाक्यवाच्यान्यसन्निधेः ।
प्रस्तावदेशकालादेवैशिष्ट्यात् प्रतिभाजुषाम ॥
See *Kāvya-Prakāśa of Mammata*, op. cit.
30. S.K. De (1959 : 1). See *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics*, Calcutta: Firma KLM.
31. Mahārṣi Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya*: 15.
लोकोत्तोर्यप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रयोग धर्मनियमः
See *Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, Ed. Pandit Caru Dutta Shastri. New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas.
32. Viśvanātha, *Sāhityadarpaṇam*: 64.
सत्याद्युद्बोधका लोके विभावाः काव्यनाट्ययोः
See *Sāhityadarpaṇam of Viśvanātha*, Trans. & Ed. Ses Raj Sharma Regmi. New Delhi: Krishna Das Academy.
33. K.C. Pandey (1950: 15). See *Comparative Aesthetics*, Vol. I. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Sansthan.
34. Abhinavagupta, *Abhinavabhāratī*: 513.

अथोत्तरमाह— परस्परकृता सिद्धिस्तयोरभिनये भवेत् । अभिनये साक्षात्कारे सम्पन्ने तदुपयोगितया विभावादिव्यपदेश इत्यतो या परस्परकृता सिद्धिः सा भद्रं भवेदित राम्भाव्यते ।

See *Abhinavabhārati of Abhinavagupta*, op. cit.

15. Viśvanātha, *Sāhitya-darpanam*: 104.

अविरुद्धा विरुद्धा वा, यं तिरोधातुमक्षमाः ।

आस्वादांगकुरकन्दोसौ भावः स्थायीति संमतः ॥ 174 ॥

See *Sāhitya-darpanam of Viśvanātha*, op. cit.

16. Abhinavagupta, *Abhinavabhārati*: 481.

तस्मात् स्थायीरुपचित्तवृत्तिसूत्रस्यूता ... वततस्मिन् सूत्रे स्वसंस्कारवै-
चित्रयमनिवेश्यन्तोऽपि ... शुद्धमपि स्थायिसुत्रं ... स्थायीबिलक्षण एव रसः ।

See *Abhinavabhārati of Abhinavagupta*, op. cit.

THE ACCIDENTAL ORIENTALIST

A world divided into East and West remains central in locational conceptions of the Russian subject: does it represent Europe's barbaric Asiatic "other half" or constitutive element of a "Greater Europe"? The dichotomy, which has been traced back to the geopolitical and historiographical imagination of the Enlightenment,¹ evolved into a principal internalized component of Russian articulations of the self since the late eighteenth century, which was inaugurated by Peter the Great's legendary resolve to "open a window to the West" and bring the nation at par with European imperial powers. For more than two centuries, liminal geographical position across Europe and Asia has served as trope of either abjection or triumph in the Russian national imaginary. Strong continuities of both attitudes may be found in post-Soviet rhetoric, ranging from Mikhail Gorbachev's resolution to locate the nation "in a common European home" to the recent appropriation of "Eurasia" as an intellectual and political signifier of oppositional identity in the face of Russia's perceived alignment with the U.S.-Eurocenter.²

In comparison, conceptions of "the orient" in Tsarist and Soviet Russia have only recently begun to be explored. In active dialogue with Edward Said's seminal work, Russia's own oriental imperium in Crimea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia has attracted considerable critical attention.³ Though cognizant of Said's own distinction between "western" and "Russian", "colonial" and "contiguous" empires—the former "jump[ing] thousands of miles beyond their own borders to other continents" and the latter, "exclusively by adjacence," "swallow[ing] whatever land or peoples stood next to its borders and in the process moving farther and farther east and south"⁴—such scholarship defines the relationship between European and Russian orientalisms primarily in terms of derivation.⁵

Conspicuously absent are considerations of ways in which Russia's own orientalization in western eyes might have been mediated through Europe's "colonial" orient, or the latter's contribution to Russian conceptions of spatialized identity beyond serving as model for a poetics of empire. This essay focuses on such alternative modes of interaction. It examines the appropriation of a genre, location, and figure typically associated with "western" and particularly British orientalism—travel narratives set in the Indian subcontinent that prominently feature wandering Hindu ascetics—for challenging not only the dichotomous imagination of Russia as either "European" or "Asiatic", but also the very logic of imperial geography and historiography.

The text under investigation here is titled "Yasir" (a term variously denoting "captive", "slave", or "servant" in Arabic, Tartar, and several Turkic languages), a short work of lyrical prose composed in 1918-19 by Velimir Khlebnikov (1885-1922), a Futurist poet and philosopher of history.⁶ Set in the seventeenth century, "Yasir" recounts the adventures of Istoma, a fisherman from a "half-wild island" (103) in the delta where the river Volga falls into the Caspian Sea. In Astrakhan, the regional market town that served as a trading post between northern Russia, Central Asia, and the steppe for centuries, he meets a holy man from the Indian subcontinent called Krishnamurti. Krishnamurti mesmerizes him with "news" from his native land about resistance movements against Aurangzeb (1618-1707), scion of the Mughal Empire. Istoma spends a night haunted by tales of Nanak (1469-1539), founder of the non-denominational movement of seekers (Sikh), a community comprised of peasants who would later mount armed rebellions against coercive taxation and religious persecution of the Mughals; Kabir (1440-1518), the Sufi mystic with whom Nanak is said to have travelled the hovels of the dispossessed; and Shivaji (1627-80), leader of a successful guerilla army which wrested an autonomous state from Aurangzeb. The fisherman begins to follow his informant, who feeds stray dogs and frees a captive swan from the marketplace, demanding whether such symbolic acts of liberation can "free a whole nation." Krishnamurti merely answers, "you will see my country soon" (107). As if in fulfillment of this prophecy, Istoma is taken eastwards by steppe nomads, and eventually guided to the Indian subcontinent by an intrepid Sikh called Kunby. There, he spends the next five years meandering among itinerant ascetics. He

discovers that true self-knowledge can only be attained through constant movement, which reveals as the falsity of all material, social, and territorial attachments. The experience ultimately brings him to a realization of the basic tenets of anti-dualistic (*advaita*) metaphysics. *Advaita* thought deems the division between subject and object as ephemeral illusion (*Maya*); instead, the self (*atman*) is posited as one with the world-spirit or universal essence (*Brahman*), and human existence in the phenomenal world as a journey through successive veils of *Maya* with the ultimate objective of reuniting the *atman* with the *Brahman*. Istoma's continued meanderings accidentally bring him back to his island on the Volga-Caspian estuary, but its familiarity no longer inspires a sense of belonging. The narrative ends with the following elegiac question: "Stopping momentarily before the familiar waves, Istoma moved on. Where?— he did not know." (115)

The hermeneutic challenges presented by this unusual narrative—with its juxtaposition of clichés and nuanced interpretations of *advaita vedanta*, polyglossic mixture of Russian, Tartar, and Turkic dialects of the lower Volga region alongside Sanskrit, and resistance to easy mapping in both territorial and historical terms—is evident from its virtual absence in the considerable body of scholarship dedicated to figurations of "the orient" in Khlebnikov's work.⁷ In order to approach the seeming incommensurables pervading "Yasir", it is necessary to first explore the ideological dimensions of a phenomenon whose aesthetic contours have only recently begun to be illuminated: the cultivation of so-called "ancient Indian philosophy" among the Russian avant-garde before and directly after the 1917 Revolution. Art historians John Bowlt and Charlotte Douglas have traced how concepts such as *maya* and *nirvana* provided symbiotic validation for epistemic quests of several generations of Russian thinkers, writers, and artists, including the Symbolists' search for a "noumenon" or "essence", the Futurists' goal of making language "transrational," and the "nonobjectivism" of Kazimir Malevich and Wassily Kandinsky's paintings.⁸

The circulation of putatively "ancient" Indian thought in Russian "living rooms, dacha parties, public lectures, and the popular press",⁹ although documented, has not been contextualized against the interface between political culture and cultural politics of the early twentieth century. Why would India— whose academic study, as histories of

Russian orientology (*vostokovedenie*) demonstrate, was marginal compared to that of spheres of direct imperial activity in the Caspian, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East ¹⁰— suddenly begin to loom large in the cultural imagination? What ensured its enduring relevance for successive generations of modernists with widely divergent, sometimes oppositional aesthetic and social agendas?

The answer should be sought, first and foremost, in the links between the emergence of Russian indophilia and a re-orientation of the national geopolitical gaze from west to east. Following a failed alliance with European powers in the Crimean War of 1853-56, Russia entered what Rudyard Kipling termed the “Great Game” of contestation with the British Empire in the Eurasian heartland. With the conquest of strategic Uzbek and Turkmen territories in the 1870s and 80s, its dominions extended almost up to the border of British India, and policy statements on “superseding British hegemony in Asia” began to envision the Indian subcontinent as the ultimate destination of Russia’s eastward march. ¹¹ Following the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869, tropes of an orient that lay beyond Russia’s imperial purview but had long become enshrined in the European imagination as the “mysterious East” and “cradle of civilization” began to flood the popular press. From a list of late-nineteenth-century travelogues compiled by P.I. Tartakovsky, it is evident that Russian writers frequently employed those precise terms in representing the Indian subcontinent. Titles such as “The Unknown East,” “In the Land of the Yogis,” “The Jungles of India,” and “Mysterious Bombay” were complemented by “numerous volumes of ancient Hindu wisdom decorating shop windows.” ¹²

An organizational node for the production, dissemination, and consumption of “ancient Hindu wisdom” in Russia has recently been identified in the theosophical movement and its allied networks. Maria Carlson, in a meticulously documented history, demonstrates that theosophy created and sustained a large heterogeneous community of academics, translators, and gifted enthusiasts, among whom were key figures of burgeoning modernist movements. Carlson cites the influence of Helena Blavatsky (1831-91), an expatriate Russian who founded and ran the Theosophical Society from London and later New York, and her successor Annie Besant (1847-1933), who embraced theosophy in 1889 and moved the headquarters of the movement to the South Indian town

of Adyar, on several generations of the Russian intelligentsia.¹³ Besides Blavatsky and Besant's major works, translated and circulated since the late 1880s, Douglas catalogues a virtual spate of related publications that appeared in the period of heightened millenarian expectation and liberalized censorship in the wake of the 1905 revolution: William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (*Mnogoobrazie religioznogo opyta*, 1909); Swami Vivekananda's lectures on Raja-Yoga delivered in the United States (*Filosofia Ioga: Lektsii o radzhe ioge, so vklucheniem aforizmov Patandzhali*, 1906) and *Practical Vedanta* (*Prakticheskaiia Vedanta*, 1912); and William Walker Atkinson's (Yogi Ramcharak) *Paths to Attainments of the Indian Yogis* (*Puti dostizheniia indiskikh iogov*, 1913).¹⁴

The list, apart from revealing a circuit of textual influences, provides important clues towards understanding the ideological appeal of such works in the particular context of revolutionary Russia. Dominated not by primary texts—the cornerstone of academic oriental studies—but interpretive applied capsules geared towards a non-specialized audience, they transform the east from esoteric object of scholarly inquiry into translatable pieces of practicable knowledge. Blavatsky's message, in particular, was performatively inclusive, hearkening back to older reformist movements from the Indian subcontinent that sought to end social inequity as much as dogmatic dissonance: *advaita* Vedanta, the non-dualistic metaphysics that Shankaracharya propounded in the eighth century in response to brahminical sectarianism and corruption, functioned as a central tenet of her teachings. Under the aegis of an epistemology that posits all attachments and attributions, difference and discrimination, to be false, she was able to define theosophy in 1890 as "not a religion but an international community of conscience."¹⁵

Why access to the "mysterious East" would hold even greater promise for the radical Russian intelligentsia than Blavatsky's English-speaking audiences becomes apparent when juxtaposed with a coeval paradigm shift in nationalist philosophies of history at the turn of the twentieth century. In contrast with mid-nineteenth-century Slavophile thought, whose premise derived from Orthodox Christian Russia's spiritual separation from the west, millenarian eschatology at the turn of the twentieth century often invoked a genealogical locus of distinction in the nomadic steppe. Replete with cultural memories of the Mongol

invasion between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries and Russia's reverse expansion eastwards since the sixteenth, the Central Asian and Siberian steppe had traditionally been a negative space from which "civilized" metropolitan Russia of Moscow and St. Petersburg sought to distantiate itself; paradoxically, it could not be banished from the national consciousness precisely because Russia continued to constitute the Asiatic Other in the European imagination. In the era of the Great Game, however, many influential thinkers began to valorize rather than deny the nation's peripheral identity in European eyes by invoking precisely this "Asiatic" affiliation.¹⁶ While the transformation is never connected with Russian indophilia, "ancient India" often serves as the frame for the newfound nostalgia of the steppe.

The influential philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev in 1890 recuperated Goethe's famous portrait of humanity worshipping on the Ganges in a poem entitled *Ex Oriente Lux*, followed by an essay, "Panmongolism," in 1896 announcing the imminent end of universal history by the invasion of a unified Asiatic horde. Both "orients" through which Solov'ev inverts the directionality of Hegel's famous formulation were recuperated and reinterpreted by successive generations. The Symbolist poets Valery Bruysov and Alexander Blok respectively identified "ancient Indian truths waiting to be discovered" and used the Buddha as composite metaphor of poet and moral preceptor alongside the steppe horseman during the revolutionary era.¹⁷ The well-travelled fabulist Ivan Bunin attributed his "love for India, the mysterious East and spiritual cradle of humanity," to "my own organic ancestral pull towards the orient."¹⁸ The Futurist movement— of which Khlebnikov was a founding member— and its avant-garde offshoots, while denouncing the "bourgeois mysticism" of previous generations, nevertheless declared their affinity to art forms of "the ancient East" as "antidote for our servile subservience to Europe."¹⁹

The oppositional geopolitical logic in the above examples posits ancient India not only as epistemic antidote to what the philosopher Nikolai Danilevsky called two centuries of "mimicking Europe,"²⁰ but also a channel for sublimating Russia's own oriental status in European eyes. Such extensions of Russia's "contiguous" to Europe's "colonial" orient, nevertheless, manifest a profound paradox with regards to both. Speaking of the Russian empire, Loshchits and Turbin emphasize that

despite appropriating the steppe as symbolic site of regeneration, members of the Russian intelligentsia did not relinquish their subject position in the nation's Europeanized metropolitan centres; thus the empire, located almost entirely in Asia, is "reduced to a mere object in the creative process."²¹ Through the prism of this trenchant formulation, India in the examples cited above could be viewed as both spatial and temporal counterpart of the steppe. Despite being identified as site of resistance, its perception and representation unreflectively derive from and indeed reiterate, clichéd European formulations. Borrowing from David Spurr's analysis of the production of British imperial rhetoric, it may be said that the Russian imagination of India does not detract from the modality of conscious "distantiation" in which the east remains forever "a mere object of beauty held at arm's length," frozen in *a priori* antiquity.²²

Khlebnikov's engagement with both orients, in contrast, may be theorized in terms of a constant negotiation between past and present, and between what Henri Lefebvre terms "representational space" and "representation of space"—the former a lived, embodied category generated from workaday interactions with structures of power and inequity, and the latter its more abstract conceptualization.²³ A productive channel for examining his departure is the less-explored physical mode of eastern asceticism practiced by disciplining the body and undertaking arduous journeys over long distances. While some Russian bohemians undertook such "pilgrimages" to European art capitals, the Holy Land, and even North Africa as part of "the ritual of preparation for the day of awakening when the transfigured human would make the final journey,"²⁴ for Khlebnikov nomadism and its attendant indigence was not so much a fashionable cult as an existential condition. The trajectory of his lifelong tableaux of wandering, moreover, does not point outwards to the originary loci of Europe's orients such as the Levant or Egypt; rather, it traces a cyclical course inwards, beginning and culminating in the fluid multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious borders of the Russian empire in the south and east. Born in Astrakhan, he moved to St. Petersburg in 1907 to study first mathematics and then linguistics, including a year of Sanskrit. In the wake of the October Revolution, he joined a Red Army contingent going to Baku in Armenia and then the Persian region of Gilan to assist local uprisings. This last journey

is often cited as his proverbial “final pilgrimage”, during which the Indian ascetic among other “oriental” figures comes to dominate his self-representation as poet and prophet.³⁵

“Yasir” remains the fullest exploration of this trope in Khlebnikov’s late writings. Yet the few scholarly considerations of the text, apart from explicating the obvious biographical convergences between author and protagonist, remain further circumscribed by a homogeneous critical conception of “the orient” that does not differentiate between or delve into the multiplicity of spaces through which the protagonist moves. How might the two coordinates of wandering in the narrative— one within Khlebnikov’s familiar “representational space” of Russia’s Asiatic margins, and the other in the “represented space” of the distant Indian subcontinent— be correlated?

In order to answer the question, it is necessary to turn to the qualitatively different sensibility that Khlebnikov brings to the same sources of esoteric knowledge from ancient India plumbed by his intellectual predecessors and coevals. A contextual examination of “Yasir” demonstrates that the Volga fisherman’s journey reflects a profoundly political reception of theosophy which, rather than privileging its mystical appeal, defines its relevance in terms of historical processes unfolding in both Russia and the Indian subcontinent. Correspondingly, the figure of the peripatetic ascetic, far from remaining a passive object in the landscape of the “mysterious East,” evolves into an active conduit, for encoding three radical objectives. The first is to imbue the contact between Russia and the Indian subcontinent, embodied in Krishnamurti’s momentous appearance in Istoma’s village, with explosive epistemic potential for historicizing both spaces as products of imperial processes and revealing a continuum between the formation of “contiguous” and “colonial” orients. The second is to employ this newfound consciousness for dismantling the dichotomous cartography of east and west, north and south, mandated and perpetuated by imperial imagination. The third and most significant objective is to liberate subjectivity from territorial boundaries, and offer in their stead a perspective generated from constant movement between invisible, heterogenous spaces of dispossession at the margins of named spaces.

The genesis and implications of these objectives can be explored by situating “Yasir” within the cross-referential network of three groups

of texts: theosophical sources that inspire the narrative and provide its subtexts; Khlebnikov's extra-literary efforts to articulate the links between imperialism, historiography, and spatialized construction of identity in the years between his study of Sanskrit and the October Revolution; and a manifesto titled "India-Russian Union," composed simultaneously with "Yasir", which amplifies the fictional work's possibilities into a revisionist cartography conceived and articulated from multiple peripheries of the Euro-Asian landmass.

The sudden appearance of the itinerant Indian sage constitutes the point of departure in "Yasir". Krishnamurti enters Istoma's world not with symbolic promises of transcendental wisdom but rather "news" (*novosti*) of liberation movements organized by disenfranchised minorities. This figure, whose stories instigate the fisherman's first reflections on his own self and community as *yasir*—enslaved captives—reverses the conventional directionality of contact between orient and occident and enmeshes the Volga-Caspian borderland in shared contemporaneity with the "mysterious East." The first glimpse of India in "Yasir," therefore, reveals not timeless spiritualism but a history of colonial subjugation and dispossession also experienced by Istoma's "half-wild" tribe. The promise of political freedom is thus deeply embedded in its spiritual counterpart.

Krishnamurti is the bearer of this promise as well as the catalyst of Istoma's self-awareness. His name provides us with the first clue towards assessing the role of Khlebnikov's unusual reception of theosophy. Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986) was the name of an impoverished Brahmin boy whom Annie Besant brought into international prominence. "Discovered" on a lonely beach near Adyar, the headquarters of the theosophical society, he was anointed figurehead of a new movement called "Star of the East"; on a tour through Europe and the United States in 1911, Besant presented the young man as a syncretic embodiment of both Christ and the Buddha. The doctrinal debate generated around this messianic figure, documented in detail by Carlson, demonstrates that Krishnamurti was featured in the Russian press at the conjunctural moment of Khlebnikov's immersion in Sanskrit.²⁶ What remains unexamined in the Russian context, however, is the reception of Besant's increasing political activism in the same period. The cataclysmic years of the First World War preceding the composition of "Yasir" led up not

only to the Russian Revolution but also the coalescence of anti-imperialist sentiments in British India. Historians cite Besant's work on the behalf of women and untouchables as a powerful basis for her alliance with Gandhi, whose espousal of the disenfranchised transformed the nationalist movement from elite to mass phenomenon.²⁷

The interval between Krishnamurti's appearance in the Russian media and the October Revolution marks a profound transformation in Khlebnikov's conception of the relationship between space, time, and subjectivity. Raymond Cooke, in his critical biography, summarizes it as a shift "from pan-Slavism to pan-Asianism" alongside the metamorphosis of the poetic persona from Futurist "warrior" to a "prophet" in search of a new epistemology of history.²⁸ The unexplored connections between these spatial and temporal coordinates are crucial for interpreting the significance of Krishnamurti's impact on the fictional Istoma, causing the latter's two-pronged turn towards interiority and the East. In the years preceding the composition of "Yasir," Khlebnikov develops a perspectival apparatus increasingly focused on the Asiatic periphery of the Russian empire rather than its Slavic identity of separation from Europe, through which he engages in a radical reexamination of the self as both individual and historical subject. The emergence of a paradigm for accomplishing this task, along with sources and inspirations for the text under consideration here, may be discerned in two non-literary genres that begin to dominate his oeuvre through the 1910s. The first, using Mary Louise Pratt's term, may be named "reverse autoethnography."²⁹ The second consists of efforts towards developing a philosophy of world history.

In a series of "autobiographical notes" and "self-statements" composed between 1914 and 1917, Khlebnikov reinscribes his origin in a space marked by conquests and counter-conquests in the lower Volga region. An elaborate tropology of Astrakhan and its surroundings in these writings invokes and then subverts the paradigmatic binary opposition along which the Russian national imaginary had been iterated since its emergence as an imperial power in the eighteenth century: the conflict between its "settled, civilized" western part, with a trajectory comparable to or at least identifiable with that of Europe, and its "nomadic, chaotic" Asiatic face, haunted by memories of the Mongol occupation.³⁰ In Khlebnikov's reclamation of his past, the

implicit frontier between the two— naturalized through metaphorical boundaries such as the Ural Mountain or Volga River and the environmental division between forest and steppe ³¹— is transformed into a polymorphous, dynamic bridge between Russia's estranged halves.

The self-descriptions mimic the genre of the census survey (*anketa*), one of whose purposes is to determine a fixed ethnic identity (*natsionalnost*) for an individual— an institution dating back to the height of imperial expansion in the early nineteenth century, revitalized in Soviet multiculturalism, and continuing as part of the Russian identification system today. ³² As with geographic and historiographic conventions, however, Khlebnikov transforms the *anketa* into a lyrical exposition of reinventing the self in the porous space of the border, within which erased identities may be recovered and indeed given mythological dimensions. He repeatedly refers to his birth on Khanskaya Stavka (Khanate Headquarters), an island on the Volga-Caspian estuary that bears layered traces of both earlier steppe empires and modern Russia's eastward expansion. Various describing it as "a camp of Mongol Buddhist nomads ... the dried bottom of a vanished part of the Caspian (the sea of forty names)," "the Kalmyk steppe, or the maritime frontier of Russia near the mouth of the Volga river," Khlebnikov adds a cosmological connotation to the locale: "I belong to the place which ... more than once during the course of centuries ... has held the balance of Russian history and shaken the scales." He also delineates a family tree that self-consciously celebrates intermingling between ethnic and religious groups carefully separated by the ideational divide between "European" and "Asiatic" Russia. Performatively declaring that his veins bear Slavic, Central Asian, and Mongol blood— the most suppressed part of European Russia's identity— the poet attributes his antipathy to territorialized conceptions of the subject in the following words: "The wandering instinct is part of my heritage, because there is nomad blood in my veins." ³³

If the pluralization and minoritization of the subject in the above passages supply the metaphorical contours of Istoma's awakening to the erased parts of his legacy, Khlebnikov's experiments in philosophy of history serve as a productive frame for analyzing the subsequent extension of his protagonist's quest to the Indian subcontinent. Identification and empathy function in "Yasir" as prime vehicles through

which Krishnamurti's "news" of brutal suppression of resistance movements becomes as vital a part of Istoma's awareness as tales of solidarity among the disenfranchised: "The fisherman fell asleep, his head still full of images of a prisoner thrown into a pit where toads crawled across his face; of governors who extracted tribute in baskets of human eyes; of governors who stitched shut the mouths of the talkative and sliced open the mouths of the uncommunicative"; waking up, he witnesses a triumphant procession of *streltsy*, the tsar's crack forces, for suppressing treasonous rebellions on the borders, marching through the town (105). The seamless imagistic passage from the distant "mysterious East"—transformed from object of beauty to scene of state-sponsored violence—to the immediate reality of similar forces operating in Russia's "contiguous Orient" may be identified with the modes and methods through which Khlebnikov embarked on his quest for a unified epistemology of history in the years preceding the composition of the fictional work.

The turn from "pan-Slavism to pan-Asianism" is manifested in these efforts in a remarkable turning of the gaze from west to east in search of paradigms for world history. Instead of Germany, whose perception as inheritor of Roman and then Teutonic models of expansion animated much of pan-Slavic resistance in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (including some of Khlebnikov's own early writings),³⁴ it is India, the "jewel in the crown" of the British Empire, that comes to occupy a prominent position in his calculations as primary oppositional model and principal point of departure for a reevaluation of Russia's past and present. Khlebnikov's study stems, first and foremost, from a layered comparison of imperialisms linking multiple contexts and periods that are not usually examined in a continuum. His method is mathematical, in which matrices and algorithms are used to link large power structures from different eras and parts of the world: Europe's presence in the East in such formulae are integrated with Russia's expansionist activities in its south-eastern margins, and modern forms of empire are in turn examined in light of pre-European structures of dominance and subjugation established in the same areas. The hallmark of Khlebnikov's approach—radical correlation of spaces and times usually separated in the historical imagination—is manifest in the spatio-temporal conundrums of "Yasir". The iconic figure of Krishnamurti,

twentieth-century spiritual leader behind whom theosophy's metamorphosis into political movement can only be discerned with a hermeneutic eye, is superimposed on the Astrakhan landscape of the seventeenth century.

Illustrations of such extrapolations across space and time may be found in Khlebnikov's numeric exegeses on world history. "Preceptor and Disciple" ("Uchitel' i uchenik"),³⁵ an essay published in 1912 that replicates the narrative strategy of Istoma's numerous conversations with Indian ascetics, presents a matrix for historicizing the lower Volga region through a series of negotiations between the past and present of the Indian subcontinent. Correspondences between geopolitical shifts in the two loci are used to advance the hypothesis that the British inherited and replicated structures of social and political oppression from the preceding Mughal Empire (288); similar parallels are recorded between Russia's role in the contemporaneous Great Game played out in Russia's Central Asian colonies and Ivan the Terrible's late-sixteenth-century retaliatory invasion of Kazan, the legendary last bastion of the retreating Mongol empire, with the help of a special battalion of archers, depicted in "Yasir", called the *streltsy* (285).

A powerful counter-narrative to this network of violence can also be found in "Preceptor and Disciple." It is established by the means of extraordinary juxtapositions between reformers and resisters of homogenizing forces, be they imperial, national, religious, linguistic, or ethnic. Khlebnikov traces an intricate connection between Stepan Razin in seventeenth-century Astrakhan with three instances from different periods of the Indian subcontinent. Razin, a Volga pirate who was publicly beheaded in Moscow after leading a failed separatist insurgency in alliance with myriad ethnic communities of the region, is invoked as a fugitive but powerful presence in the folk imagination in "Yasir": immediately following the march of the *streltsy*, Istoma hears "the name of Razin rippling in whispers through the marketplace." (105) In "Preceptor and Disciple," Razin's emergence and martyrdom are posited in conjunction with 317, a tentative date of the Buddha's enlightenment that led him to found a community based on the repudiation of the dominant caste and class hierarchies; 1526, the year of the Panipat battle in which Babar, the founder of the Mughal empire, won the throne of Delhi; and 1857, the famous Sepoy Mutiny of Indian subalterns which,

in spite of being doomed from the very start, elicited the first widespread resistance against the British by Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh communities together (285 and 290-91).

The First World War, during which Khlebnikov was briefly and unwillingly conscripted— Ronald Vroon cites a letter in which he describes himself as a “yogi” whose free spirit is profoundly alienated within the strictures of the imperial army ³⁶— occasioned an exponential proliferation in his investigations of history through the trope of imperial violence. The first extended pamphlet on the subject was published in 1916 under the title *New Teachings about War* (*Novoe uchenie o voine*), in which the initial calculations and conclusions of “Preceptor and Disciple” are greatly expanded in both scope and complexity. In a section of this work entitled “The Law of Generations” (“Zakon pokolenii”), Khlebnikov pays tribute to Russian thinkers whom he considers intellectual predecessors in the task of retrieving invisible connections in the web of marginalized histories; among them he names Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, the founder of the theosophical movement. ³⁷ Concomitant with Khlebnikov’s strategy of moving through time discussed so far— which may be summarized as multidirectional wanderings through multiple pasts as a means of continually negotiating the immediate present— the foundational figure of theosophy can be narratologically discerned in “Yasir” only in the crucial latter part set in the Indian subcontinent. While its twentieth-century icons, the directly represented Krishnamurti and the implicit Besant, are perceived as instrumental in the protagonist’s rising consciousness of imperial dominance, the least discussed of Blavatsky’s works from the late nineteenth century provides the source text for the Volga fisherman’s discovery of an epistemology of resistance.

“Blavatsky was the only one,” writes Khlebnikov in *New Teachings about War*, “who travelled all the way to India for an answer to the question of being Russian.” ³⁸ The accolade at first glance seems cryptic, because Blavatsky’s most famous and widely disseminated works— *Isis Unveiled* (1877), *The Secret Doctrine* (1888), and *Keys to Theosophy* (1889)— are not accounts based on direct experience of the subcontinent but rather transcriptions of teachings ostensibly received by psychical means from “great souls” or *mahatmas* hidden from the public eye; Russia, moreover, does not constitute a prominent referent in any of the

above “mystical” treatises. An exception in her oeuvre from both standpoints is a lengthy account generated by her only documented physical journey through British India. This narrative is also the only substantial composition she undertook in her native tongue Russian and published in mainstream periodicals rather than a specialized venue. Under the title *From the Caves and Jungles of Hindustan* (*iz peshcher i debrei Indostana*), her “live” dispatches were serialized weekly in the popular journals *Moscow News* (*Moskovskie Vedomosti*) and *Russian Reporter* (*Russkii vestnik*) between 1879 and 1886. The columns were compiled and republished in book form in 1912 by the well-known Petersburg publishing house, *New Times* (*Novoe vremia*), at the precise time when Khlebnikov was published “Preceptor and Disciple” following his academic pursuit in oriental studies at St Petersburg University.³⁹

Blavatsky’s open-ended account of a self-defined “quest to know myself” “without a fixed route or itinerary” (17) defies the conventions of contemporaneous travel narratives in every sense of the term. Its eccentricity perhaps accounts for the surprisingly little attention it has received from both enthusiasts and critics, the latter including Carlson: in a substantial, meticulously researched chapter on Blavatsky’s reception in Russia, the historian devotes only a scant paragraph to a summary of her “colorful descriptions of exotic India.”⁴⁰ Even a cursory reading of *Caves and Jungles of Hindustan*, however, reveals fundamental convergences between Blavatsky’s unusual modes of perception and representation with those of Khlebnikov’s. It is impossible to trace Blavatsky’s meanderings from well-trodden sites to obscure “caves and jungles” long erased from local memory and insignificant from both the cartographer and historian’s point of view; the account seems overburdened with long associative digressions that privilege popular mythology and memory over macrohistorical events, pitting germs of wisdom gleaned from accidental encounters with itinerant holy men against painstakingly compiled knowledge by academic orientalists; the realism of her vivid descriptions is abandoned at practically every step for allegory geared towards exploring the “figurative,” “hidden” meaning of encounters with the exotic and unfamiliar (9); the most unusual feature of Blavatsky’s account is the dominant role of the narrator’s embodied self-representation, through which every detail is mediated and the greater knowledge of which— rather than objective

information about new places and people constitutes the ultimate goal of the journey.

The most unusual, and unexamined, feature of Blavatsky's account — the political imperative with which she frames every aspect of her exploration — also provides visible coordinates for identifying *Caves and Jungles* as the hypotext for Khlebnikov's allegorical rendition of the Volga fisherman's peregrinations. Blavatsky credits the mysterious advent of a Krishnamurti-like figure as the primary inspiration for embarking on her journey. This catalyst is Swami Dayananda Saraswati (1824-33), an ascetic who spearheaded a movement called Arya Samaj. Revival of Shankaracharya's *advaita* philosophy provided the epistemic framework for the community's grassroots activism against the caste system, illiteracy, and gender inequality. Upon arriving in India and witnessing this "mahatma's" activities first-hand, the traveller begins to apprehend the worldly significance of his movement (16-37). Dayananda was among the pioneering figures of the late nineteenth century — Vivekananda being a later prominent example — who explicitly aligned the project of recuperating indigenous epistemologies, especially the *Vedas*, with burgeoning nationalist movements.⁴¹ Blavatsky's analysis of the *advaita* credo "know thyself" (*atmanan biddhi*), which recurs numerous times throughout the account, centers upon its interpretation as the epistemic counterpart of resistance to imperialism: a return inwards and into one's own past constitutes the first step of "freeing the self from its own chimeras inherited from colonizers." (20-21)

Historicizing the contemporaneous relevance of *advaita Vedanta* in conjunction with political liberation, in fact, colours the representation of Blavatsky's own objectives from the very outset. Seeking out obscure sites, eccentric personalities, and world-views disparaged by western travellers and scholars of the orient alike — ruins of unnamed temples, the impoverished local soothsayer, esoteric myths and folklore — the theosophist positions herself as archaeologist of subordinated and invisible histories of knowledge. In the first chapter, Blavatsky programmatically declares that she would be looking for the "real Indian unknown to its conquerors" (112) beyond the "systematized portrait" produced by European scholarship (9-10). Khlebnikov's protagonist traces a similar meandering trajectory among obscure locales and humble personae, hidden from the eye of the typical traveller-orientalist, whose

descriptions are almost identical with the sites of Blavatsky's greatest epiphanies: "green gardens above the ruins of ancient temples, trees rooting in the white stones of staircases" (114), "caves of eternal twilight where no one had stepped for a thousand years" containing "holy men of terrifying aspect" (112). Among the first "mantras" the Volga fisherman adopts from one of his occasional teachers is the *Vedanta* initiate's chant of forsaking the ego and turning inwards, whose first phrase, "know thyself", is instrumental for Blavatsky. Istoma's refrain becomes "Be yourself, by yourself, by means of yourself, penetrate the depths of yourself" (112).

The revival of *Vedanta* in the age of high colonialism, however, does not delimit Blavatsky's project of recuperating lost histories of resistance. Lengthy passages are devoted to Nanak, Kabir and Shivaji (209-38; 381-85; 60-69, 130-32). Dating back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—the period of Razin's uprising in the lower Volga and the time frame in which Khlebnikov's "Yasir" is set—such narratives play a vital role in historicizing contemporaneous retrieval of indigenous epistemologies as reenactments of spiritual movements that unified the disenfranchised in active resistance against the Mughal Empire. Blavatsky's analogies bear close resemblance with Khlebnikov's method of layering histories of dominance and resistance. The particular personalities she highlights in her travelogue, moreover, are identical to the iconography through which Krishnamurti initiates Istoma to the idea of freedom through self-knowledge. Nanak's Sikhs, prominently featured in both Blavatsky's account and the "news" imparted by the fictional sage, act as the incarnated conduit through which the fisherman is first introduced to egalitarian asceticism amidst perpetual displacement. To Kunby, the Sikh who serendipitously arrives in the steppe to turn Istoma's steps towards the Indian subcontinent, the protagonist introduces himself with the words, "I too am a Sikh" before "begin[ning] a wandering life together with him" (112).

It is through similar modes of communitarian identification and spontaneous movement with peripatetic ascetics that Blavatsky narrates her journey. In the first chapter of *Caves and Jungles*, she derides a number of both geographical and historical "guides" on the grounds that "everything they contain is refracted through the commercial and political interests of Europeans come to India's shores, obscuring her

real vistas and her heart" (4-5, 10-11). This daring initial hypothesis that the imperial gaze has distorted her destination is amplified further in the unusual way that Blavatsky positions herself as an interpreter of knowledge about the east. Rather than defer to European scholarship, her account privileges commentaries of the Vedas and other classical texts derived exclusively from indigenous oral sources ranging from Brahmin scholars such as Dayananda to impoverished yogis and street mystics. Accounts of such acts of "witnessing," "authentic experience", and "direct communication" occupy significant space in the narrative. The merit or accuracy of her interpretations notwithstanding, what is remarkable about Blavatsky's engagement with "ancient Indian philosophy" is her condemnation of the discipline of oriental philology and the institution of oriental studies as conduits of imperial power. Philology provides the grounds on which she challenges the pioneers of Indology, including William Jones, James Colbrooke, and Max Muller, asserting that their interpretation of certain Sanskrit terms, in keeping with mercantile aspirations and cold rationality with which the west has always approached India, merely skims the "outer shell" of meaning and results in "blind objectification" (92-102, 113-18); deeper truths hidden within the same words may only be accessed by those who have learned to communicate directly and intuitively with the East. Through her own alternative interpretations that purport to reveal such "underground truths," Blavatsky attempts to render two parallel narratives of her journey : one in the phenomenal world of experience, and the other as an allegorical account of her "inner" quest without the mediating filter of the western gaze (9-10). The epistemological model of *advaita*, again, is repeatedly invoked as the logic of Blavatsky's indictment of objectivity (54-5, 89-91, 100, and 184-85, among others), and indeed the discovery of "Shankaracharya's science of love" (484) constitutes the symbolic moment of arrival for both the theosophist and Khlebnikov's fictional alter ego.

Yet the faculty of "direct communion" that Blavatsky claims—which also enables Istoma, at the conclusion of five years, to hear "the entire Indian nation groaning for a single truth ... slavery is maya The truth is in you, you are Brahma, the universal soul!" (114)—is anchored in a specific embodied consciousness. Contrary to the masked subjectivity of the orientalist, Blavatsky attributes the special access she gains to

the racial particularities of her own persona. With some relish, they are invoked at the precise junctures when the traveller encounters imperial administrators and polemicalizes with European orientalists—the two groups whose authority derives from expertise in “understanding” India. Blavatsky’s performative amplification of racialized subjectivity operates on two concentric levels. The first consists of appropriating Russia’s image as Europe’s barbaric eastern neighbour, which at the height of the Great Game is in wide circulation in Central and South Asian colonies of the British Empire (13-14). From the moment of arrival at the customs desk in Bombay through many exchanges with the bureaucracy, descriptions of the narrator’s self-identification as a Russian ironically described as “the infiltration of the spy” (12)—sets the stage for a cognitive distinction that extends to her implied audience: “You, my Russian readers belonging to the Eastern world, would understand my journey better” (9).

While the assumption that only the oriental mind can penetrate the esoteric truths of the East resonates with Russian intellectuals’ later genealogical identification with ancient India discussed early in this essay, the second level of self-orientalization in Blavatsky’s narrative closely approximates the position from which Khlebnikov dismantles a homogenous *a priori* conception of the Russian subject. At crucial junctures of communion in the margins of Indian society—with holy men in deep forests, mountain caverns, crematoria, or leper colonies—the narrator of *Caves and Jungles* self-consciously invokes the negative attributes of the Asiatic in Russian cultural discourse—“narrow eyes,” “broad face”, and “flat nose”—to call herself a member of the nomadic Kalmyk tribe from the empire’s south-eastern margins (510). The particular subordinate identity Blavatsky claims from Russia’s internal orient also serves as the point of departure for Khlebnikov’s self-ethnicization: he credits Kalmyks, who “returned every year to Khanskaya Stavka” (141, 144) as the inspiration for his roots-searching among steppe nomads. This assertion is translated into the metaphor of a Kalmyk chief and his daughter ending Istoma’s genealogical amnesia in “Yasir”. Initiating him to rituals of worshipping the “blank space” of the steppe (108), they prepare the traveller, like Blavatsky, to seek out tantrics, death-eaters, and other obscure practitioners of esoteric arts (114) who exist outside mainstream religion on the Indian subcontinent.

The ritual of wind-worship in the steppe, combined with the first mysterious rite Istoma witnesses of Krishnamurti performing “a marriage pouring the Ganges water into the dark Volga” “just as for many centuries camels have borne on their backs water from the two rivers to intermingle” (107-08), prefigure the elemental “blank space” where the traveller locates himself at the end. Russia’s “contiguous” and India’s “colonial” orients overlap at this site, liberating each other from imperial bondage. *Advaita* thought provides the concept of elemental emptiness, incarnated in metaphors of free-flowing wind and water, within which manifest differences of ritual, faith, race, and social affiliation disappear, leaving the hitherto captive subject to venerate only itself. This liberated self, the *atman* that has penetrated “the silver fabric of deception” (114) to recognize its unity with the *brahman*— transforms the Volga fisherman into a cosmic author composing “the greatest book of blank pages, the book of nature written in the clouds” (113).

The question remains, however, of what new picture of the self in the world might be inscribed in the “blank book” composed by the wanderer between Russia’s “contiguous” and India’s “colonial” orients. What implications might the conceit carry in wordly geopolitical and historical terms? The answers to these questions might be found in a manifesto dated 1918 called “Indo-Russian Union”:

As we know, the bell that sounds for Russia’s freedom will have no effect on European cars.

Like social classes, political states are either oppressor states or enslaved states.

... The great nations of the Continent of ASSU (China, India, Persia, Russia, Siam, Afghanistan) belong to the list of enslaved states. The islands are the oppressors, the continents are enslaved.

... A united Asia has risen from the ashes of the Great War.

... The will of Fate has ordained that this union be conceived in Astrakhan, a place that unites three worlds — the Aryan world, the Indian world, the world of the Caspian: the triangle of Christ, Buddha, and Mohammed.

... May the citizens of our island pass from the Yellow Sea to the Baltic, from the White Sea to the Indian Ocean, without ever encountering a frontier. May the tattooed patterns of political boundaries be wiped from Asia’s body by the will of the Asiatics. The separate lands of Asia are now united into an island. Citizens of

the new world, freed and united because of Asia, we parade in front of you. We astonish everyone.

... We begin our existence by snatching India from the clutches of Great Britain. India, you are free.

... We call for a congress of enslaved nations to meet beside the great lake. Great thoughts grow by the shores of great lakes. Here, beside the largest lake in the world, we conceived the idea of the greatest island in the world.

We summon Russia to immediate unification with young China for the education of the world's greatest interior, Asia.

We sacrifice our hearts to the triangle proclaimed by these races. In so doing we make our names deathless forever and tangle them into the mane of the coursing centuries.

Follow us, you people! ⁴²

The historical point of departure for this text, composed simultaneously with "Yasir", is the Russian Revolution, with its diction transparently reproducing the many declarations of emancipation issued in the wake of 1917. While growing anti-imperialist sentiments, particularly in British India, were regularly invoked in revolutionary discourse— Lenin dedicated several essays to "the awakening of Asia" between 1914 and 1921— Khlebnikov's manifesto injects a novel geopolitical orientation to the ideational unity between stateless proletarian and "enslaved nation." While the "internationalist" dimension of the Revolution was expected to unfold first towards the capitalist West, the opening lines of "Indo-Russian Union" decisively excludes Europe from its futuristic field of vision.

The manifesto proposes a new ontology of space predicated on a fundamentally pluralized conception of the orient. As Harsha Ram notes in his commentary on the neologism "ASSU," the term Asia as it is employed interchangeably in the manifesto connotes not any preexisting geographical imaginary but only a provisional recognizable name for an entity "arising" or coming into being "from the ashes" of a global paroxysm of violence. ⁴³ Although "ASSU" anticipates the connotative heterogeneity of the emerging Soviet Union, its contours radically overturn the spatial hierarchy between center and periphery that the Soviet state inherited from imperial Russia and preserved in its political and cultural centers located in

Europeanized northern metropolises. In Khlebnikov's vision, in contrast, the surprising alignment of Russia alongside the British Empire's Asiatic territories destabilizes the nation and opens up its own boundaries to scrutiny.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the site of critical introspection in "Yasir," as well as the beginning of a journey towards "enslaved nations" in the farther east, should coincide with the locus where the very "idea" of a new Asiatic "continent" is conceived. The conceptual and physical center of Khlebnikov's cartographic imagination is the southern border town of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea, "the greatest lake" on whose shores "great thoughts grow." Istoma's fictional wandering narrates the coeval growth of knowledge of the self and the world, culminating in the "great thought" of bridging diverse colonized orients. The *advaita* principle of "knowing thyself" is the first step in this journey towards epistemological and political liberation. Indeed, the cross-pollination of epistemologies defining every step of the Volga fisherman's journey serves as the justification for the naturalized genesis of "great thoughts" in the manifesto. The Caspian constitutes the inspiration for ASSU precisely because the heterogeneity of its populace, distributed among the "triangle of Christ, Buddha, and Mohammed," is further enriched by the confluence of "Indian" and "Aryan" epistemologies — the latter connoting the steppe horsemen or "Scythians" from the Caspian area, said to have diffused all through the Euro-Asiatic landmass, in whom Blavatsky locates the genealogy of both the Kalmyk nomad and the Vedas (510). In light of the above ontological signification of Astrakhan, Istoma's wandering between Russia's and Britain's orients, culminating in a momentary return to the Volga before moving on to unknown destinations, may be read simultaneously as a centripetal unification and centrifugal scattering of the self.

Such is the multidirectional, open-ended trajectory of wandering along which both the citizen and the body politic of the Asiatic continent are sketched in "Indo-Russian Union": in visions of free human passage without frontiers and healing of scarred "political boundaries," the manifesto celebrates the dissolution of both objectivized space and spatialized limitations imposed upon the subject. The virtually literalized u-topia, no-place, of ASSU may be interpreted as a geopolitical realization of the "blank space" inhabited by the

subject in *advaita* philosophy and by Khlebnikov's fictional alter ego at the end of his quest: free movement, conveyed through elemental metaphors of the open steppe and intermingling waters of the Volga and Ganges in "Yasir," find their counterparts in "Indo-Russian Union's" "maritime frontiers" and wind whistling through the "mane of centuries."

As homogeneous, universalized conceptions of the subject come under increasing scrutiny in contemporary theory and political practice, Khlebnikov's early-twentieth-century portrayal of self-realization through wandering between disparate and artificially distantiated orients seems all the more striking. Admittedly eclectic and unselfconsciously stereotypical in places, it nevertheless challenges normative spatio-temporal parameters within which colonialism and resistances to it continue to be studied. Whether in post-colonial historiography or theories of critical cosmopolitanism, the "orient" as well as the "periphery" are often conceptualized as singular bounded entities assessed in opposition to a well-defined center in the north/west: in spite of differentiated evaluations of such subordinated spaces, acts of recognition and loci of action and agency constituted *between* them seldom emerge as objects of study. The recent scholarship addressing Russia's "orient," though crucial for dismantling dominant geo-historical thinking extending from the Enlightenment to the Cold War, nevertheless remains limited within the Saidian paradigm of exclusivity between "contiguous" and "colonial" orients. The complex context from which Khlebnikov conceives an "Indo-Russian" subject opens up comparative modes of examining diverse "mysterious Easts" that continue to be intellectually abstracted.

NOTES & REFERENCES

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2. A rich body of recent scholarship historicizes this internal debate over two centuries. See Mark Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia: the Ideological Construction of Geographical Space," *Slavic Review* 50, 1 (Spring 1991): 1-17; Madhavan K. Palat, "Eurasiaanism as an Ideology for Russia's Future," *Economic and Political Weekly* vol. 27, no. 51 (December 1993): 99-109; and Susi K. Frank, "Orte und Räume der russischen Kultur. Aus Anlaß einer geokulturologischen Untersuchung zur russischen *usad'ba* von Vasilij Scukin" ("Place and Space in Russian Culture: On the Occasion of

- a Geocultural Search for the Russian *Estate* of Vasilii Shchukin”), *Die Welt der Slaven* XLV (2000): 103-32.
3. See, for example, Daniel Brower and Edward Lazzerini, eds., *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997)
 4. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1994), 10.
 5. See, for example, Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus between Pushkin and Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Kalpana Sahani, *Crucifying the Orient : Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of the Caucasus and Central Asia* (Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research, 1997); and Harsha Ram, *The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).
 6. “Yasir”, *Collected Works of Velimir Khlebnikov*, vol. II, trans. Paul Schmidt, ed. Ronald Vroon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 103-15. Subsequent references in parentheses.
 7. In a corpus of critical literature encompassing more than twenty titles (see Harsha Ram, “The Poetics of Empire: Velimir Khlebnikov between Empire and Revolution,” *Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia*, ed. Madhavan Palat [Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001], 228-29 n2), “Yasir” receives brief mention in only three: among texts that subvert nineteenth-century captivity narratives in Iu. M. Loshchits and V. N. Turbin, “The Theme of the Orient in Khlebnikov’s Oeuvre” (“Tema vostoka v tvorchestve Khlebnikova”), *Narody Azii i Afriki* 4 (1966): 147-60; in conjunction with Khlebnikov’s biography in A. E. Parnis’ “Khlebnikov in Revolutionary Gilan” (“V. Khlebnikov v revoliutsionnom Giliane”), *Narody Azii i Afriki* 5 (1967): 157-164; and as symptomatic instance of the poet’s penchant for “orientalist figurations of the Russian artist and prophet” by Harsha Ram in *Geographies of Empire: The Poetics of Orientalism in Europe and Russia*, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University 1995, 374.
 8. John Bowlt, “Esoteric Culture and Russian Society,” and Charlotte Douglas, “Beyond Reason: Malevich, Matiushin, and Their Circles,” catalogue for the exhibition *The Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 1890-1985*, Los Angeles County Museum of Art (New York: Abbeville, 1986), 165-183, 185-200.
 9. Bowlt, 170.
 10. A. A. Kozhukhovskaia et. al., *A History of Russian Orientology (Istoriia otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia* [Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, 1997]), 3-4.
 11. Memo from minister K.P. Pobedonostsev to Alexander III (1886), *Pobedonostsev and his Correspondents (Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenty* [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1923]), 1: 576.

12. P. I. Tartakovsky, *The Social Aesthetic Experience of People of the East and Velimir Khlebnikov's Poetry* (*Sotsial'no-esteticheskii opyt narodov vostoka i poezii V. Khlebnikova*) (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo FAN, 1987), 22-23.
13. Maria Carlson, "Afterword: Theosophy's Impact on Fin de Siècle Russian Culture," *No Religion Higher Than Truth: A History of the Theosophical Movement in Russia, 1875-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 188-205.
14. Douglas, 198.
15. Blavatsky, "Glossary of Theosophical Terms," Appendix to *The Key to Theosophy* (London and New York: Theosophical Publishing Company, 1889), 190.
16. For detailed discussions of this trend, see Bassin, 4-8; Frank, 120-23; and Anindita Banerjee, "The Trans-Siberian Railroad and Russia's Asia: Literature, Geopolitics, Philosophy of History," *Clio* 34, 1-2 (2004): 20-21 and 32-34.
17. On Panmongolism and its reinterpretations, see Ettore lo Gallo, "V. Solov'evs *Panmongolism*, V. Briusov's *The Twentieth Century*, and A. Blok's *Scythians*" ("Panmongolismo di V. Solov'ev, *I ventient Unni* di V. Briusov, e *Gli Scitti* di A. Blok"), *For Roman Jakobson* (The Hague: Mouton, 1956) 296-300; and Georges Nivat, "From 'Panmongolism' to 'the Eurasian Movement': History of a Literary Theme" ("Du 'panmongolisme' an 'mouvement eurasienn': Historie d'un theme littéraire"), *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 3 (1966), 460-78.
18. Quoted in Tartakovsky, 25-6.
19. Cited by Bowlt, 171.
20. "Mimicking Europe: Sickness of Russian Life" is the title of chapter II of N. Ia. Danilevsky's monumental work, *Russia and Europe* (*Rossia i Evropa*) 4th ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Panteleevykh, 1889).
21. Loshchits and Turbin, 150.
22. David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 59.
23. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, tr. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 42.
24. Bowlt, 178.
25. Ram, *Geographies of Empire*, 374.
26. Carlson, 97.
27. Besant founded the Home Rule League in 1912, and briefly became president of the Indian National Congress in 1916-17. For theosophy's links with Indian nationalism, see Ranbir Vohra, *The Making of India*, 2nd ed. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 131.

28. Raymond Cooke, *Velimir Khlebnikov: A Critical Study* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 140.
29. Pratt uses the term "autoethnography" to designate "instances in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that *engage with the colonizer's own terms*," *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 7. Khlebnikov's case, as will become clear below, represents the appropriation of autoethnography for the opposite purpose.
30. Frank, 120-123.
31. Bassin, "Classical Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity," http://www.dartmouth.edu/~crn/crn_papers/Bassin.pdf (posted 4 February 2001, accessed 1 March 2005), 3-4.
32. Martin, 23.
33. "Questionnaire," "Autobiographical Note," and "Self-Statement," *Collected Works of Velimir Khlebnikov*, vol. I, trans. Paul Schmidt, ed. Charlotte Douglas (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1989), 141-49.
34. See, for example, Nikolai Danilevsky's *Russia and Europe: A view of Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavic World to the Germano-Romanic* (*Rossiiia i Evropa. Vzgl'iad na kul 'turnye i politicheskie otnosheniia slavianskogo mira k germano-romanskomu*, 1869; 4th ed. [St Petersburg: Tipografiia Panteleevikh, 1889]), and K. N. Leont'ev, *The East, Russia, and Slavism* (*Vostok, Rossiiia, i slaviansvo* [Moscow: Tipografiia I. N. Kuishnereva, 1885-86]). References to both can be found in Khlebnikov's essay "A Friend in the West," *Collected Works I*: 243-45.
35. "Uchitel' i uchenik," *Creations (Tvoreniia)*, ed. M. Ia. Poliakova et al. (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel' 1986), 284-92. Translations mine. Subsequent references in parentheses.
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37. "Zakon pokolenii," appendix to R. Duganov, "Poet, History, Nature" ("Poet, istoriia, priroda"), *Voprosy literatury* 10 (1985): 180-90.
38. *Ibid.*, 181.
39. *From the Caves and Jungles of Hindostan*, tr. Boris de Zirkoff, *Collected Writings* (Wheaton, IL and London: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1975), supplement to vol. 50. For publication history, see Zirkoff, "Writings of Blavatsky in Russian." xxx. Subsequent references in parentheses.
40. Carlson, 51.
41. On the Arya Samaj and nationalism, see Vohra, 103.
42. *Collected Works I*: 341-2.
43. Ram, "Poetics of Eurasia," 224.

A ROADMAP TO CIVILIANIZATION

The Theme

We have heard morality tales about how writing as a supplement to speaking turns the self-sufficient image of speaking on its head. But literature itself is often enough imaged as a necessary supplement to the technical knowledges that are indeed written but do not count as true writing. This imaging oscillates between an art for art's sake aesthetic stand and a deployment of literature as political or intellectual weaponry. In this oscillation, as an old song once put it, "we are guided by the beauty of our weapons".

But it is surely not necessary for knowledge to be deployed in the military mode. For art to seek to attract is, likewise, optional. Whatever the suspicious may say, I find valid the contemporary search for a reasonable exit from this gendered world of beauty products for typecast women and military wares for stereotyped males. Now, it is obvious that a reasonable exit cannot afford to be reason-free. The trouble is that we seem not to have a usable species of reason at our disposal. To rehearse the details of this absence, the dream of a universal reason died in the early twentieth century, and the literary-philosophical episode grounding existentialism in phenomenology had failed to get its act together by the time the Parisian fashions swung from Sartre to Levi-Strauss. From structuralism onwards, the very idea of a generally usable reason has been in a state of free fall. Now that we need one, we see this quite vividly, and are duly sad. Can we do anything about this unavailability?

Fashioning a public space of knowledge that is casual enough about what counts as knowing has to begin by being generous without going all gushy over how to welcome all these guests. We have to find the right tone of voice if we wish to really ask how literature, ordinary speaking, technology, science, art, politics might all be envisaged fluidly

as ways of knowing. It is okay to accept the readily available unifying rhetoric of an intellectual republic if we imagine this republic of knowledge in a federal, democratic mode. This means imagining its provinces as capable of self-interestedly initiating mutual contact at points of maximal need. I now plunge into such adventurous imagining. Please wish me luck.

Human lives are lived in terms of meanings largely provided by the stories we listen to and tell. These stories are languaged. We are living in a context shaped partly by the institutional fact that every nation *X* sponsors either a unique national language *X* or several languages *X*₁, *X*₂, *X*₃ as its cultivated literary arenas. Every nation manages this sponsorship at several levels. The nation's literary committees award prizes for star performers. Schools force all literate children to hear about the stars of the past and some of their canonical writings. These phenomena are familiar.

What have we done with these familiar facts? We have tried, sometimes innovatively, to understand just how this state of affairs has come to seem as normal as it has. In the typical commonwealth country's colonial history, there came a moment at which modern language cultivation achieved a recognizable take-off. This moment launched the modern national management of language and literature in institutional formats recognizable to this day, although what then flourished was a classical style. Literary analysis correspondingly relied on classical models for tropes and sense-making.

Once this national language management system had its coordinates under control, for a short while and in a few places the elite felt comfortable, free, and able to spread its wings. Let us call that the moment of national modernism. That brief moment of apparent autonomy allowed many forms of the examined life to flourish. These ranged from various high modernisms, through new criticism, and the existentialisms, rooted in phenomenology or otherwise, to several left-wing forms of literary practice and analysis. The possibility of the autonomous critic in the independent nation requires national modernism as a crucible, one that corresponds to the notional and practical possibility of independent critics of the state.

The overall format in which national modernism at its inception typecast literary analysis and the critic continues as a sort of default.

But it is a troubled default. My project here is to address this sense of trouble. For the early impression of autonomy gives way to the rise of scientism and professional expertise in the great mobilization visible from the sixties. Expertise in the study of literature begins to rest its case on psychoanalytical or materialist or mythographic premises anchored in some social science willing to use literary data for its theorizing. Can we see this transition in terms of visibility shifting from the nation to its fragments? But systematizing cognition's take-over of literary analysis only partly suits the interests of those critics who wish to fracture national modernism's premature unifications of the public space. Being marginal, the fragments cannot ride the mainstream's expertise horse. Their peripheral interests and the centre's focus on expertise pull literary analysis in opposite directions. Literary studies are left in moral disarray and in a state of disregard for the niceties of the social sciences whose tools they borrow.

This mess, often called the postmodern moment, wears the specialist overalls of a redescription of literature. But its knowledge claims are best construed as an anti-foundationalism adopted out of pique. Commentators were reacting against the visible falseness of national modernism's packaged open spaces. Such pique and its over-intellectualized expressions were too unstable to last. They gave way to a moment of the media that could do more with images of the woman and of the subaltern. At that insufficiently troubled moment, literary theory's flirtation with the popular amounted to a half-hearted reopening of the public space, which it saw as contested between the texts and their framing. I would suggest that the moment of the media and the postcolonial turn are closely related sequels to the postmodern intervention.

The moment of the media reacts against the postmodern apparatus at the level of abandoning the serious appeal to social scientific expertise, but fails to reestablish a public space of possible intervention. It sponsors a tendency to ethnographize various aggregates by narrating them into communities. This is an understandable temptation, for such activity may appear to work against the hegemonies that keep margins marginal.

As a manoeuvre, though, the ethnographizing move seeks community but creates ghettos. These get in the way of the public space of rational

history-making that might otherwise emerge. Yet we do need communities, which surely only the tools of literary analysis in their current mobilization can seriously empower. This is one of the major dilemmas we face as we try to exit from national modernism.

The form of the dilemma is easy to describe. You have been stuck with an inappropriate arena, the nation. You wish to pledge allegiance to humankind, which is much larger, but inaccessible. You are now doing the next best thing, which is to look within the nation and identify with subnational collectives where the bonding is real, persons find a sense of community, and a domineering elite cannot easily emerge. This has the desired effect of undermining the hegemony of the nation's elite. But the boundaries around each subnational allegiance suddenly begin to look stronger than they should. Your dilemma takes the following form now. Do you persist, and run the risk of letting your communities turn into barricaded ghettos? Or do you abandon all bounded units and build trans-national channels? The dilemma is too big to address directly, of course. My project here is to focus on one part of this larger problem. I identify here a particular traffic jam surrounding the study of languages and literatures. Attaining some clarity about this problem will move us closer to resolving the larger dilemma of identity politics and analytical system that implement it.

The Traffic Jam

In the present intervention I focus on the intellectual content of the language-literature divide as the current enterprise acts it out and experiences it. I argue that we are caught in a traffic jam that we can begin to sort out if we recognize the perils of half-hearted expertise for what they are. I propose that we in the language-literature analysis enterprise negotiate new equations between domains where we need techno-scientific expertise and domains where we desire a public space emphatically detechnicalized.

Using the metaphor of a helicopter surveying the traffic jam and trying to guide the drivers, I shall pretend we are the sky. In other words, I offer first some elements of a possible exit, thus introducing the terms on which my formulation of the traffic jam is based.

One ingredient in the egress I visualize is a state of permanent translation that recognizes and tames the codes. The codes, or the

particular languages that are postulated and cultivated in literary texts, become less dangerous if we label them self-consciously as constructed objects of cultivation. This move begins to revise the equation between the cultural objects of literary analysis and the naturalistic subject matter of linguistics.

Moves related to this prototypical move make possible a principled rather than merely expediency-based taming of expertise as such, not merely of certain experts. In order to get ready to truly demobilize the civil space, one must first mobilize sufficiently, making expertise as technical as its content calls for. What then makes possible the demobilization the public space requires is a systematic practice of translation. To the extent that cultures are in a state of translation, they are civilized.

Translation operates as a viable means of permanent demobilization if its growth keeps up with the growth of the technical. This does not happen spontaneously. It has to be done. Translators work for specific constituencies. There is no general procedure. Particular users find this or that text hard to tackle for detectable reasons. To translate for them involves understanding what can give just those users access to the text. This understanding of the easy and the difficult must take on board clearer pictures than we now have both of the linguistic material and of the users.

As we rearticulate our pictures of what is easy or difficult for whom, we are helped by the major advances linguistics has made in our understanding of language as a single, indivisibly human object of natural study. But it does not help that we typically package the material on the assumption that "one language at a time" can validly stand in for "language as a whole", eliding the act of translation. A code is a singularly ineffectual means of imaging human language, a point that is made in much more detail later in the argument. One remedy is to insist on translation's active role in the process. Another is to give a constructed transcode (such as Esperanto) a new status in keeping with the new emphasis on the constructed character of all codes in a theoretical space that domesticates our ethnicities in non-naturalizing ways.

As we imagine being above the fray in order to take an aerial view, the flight of fancy that keeps us afloat specifically fantasizes that we

can, as true civilians, perform a countercoup. This, if successful, reverses the militarization, the inappropriately medium-degree technicalization that we have inherited from the structuralist roots of the postmodern moment. As long as we don't have a viable army under civilian control, we are all semi-armed, a half-way house that denies us the advantages of the true civilian and the true soldier. I am taking the helicopter down now, and splitting it. Half of me is asking how we can become true civilians cheerful enough to tame the grim military element we cannot do without. The other half is equipping itself with the tools we need so that the public space can be tool-free. This split helicopter, now on the jammed ground, begins to do a walking survey of the traffic jam I promised to take a closer look at.

I shall first introduce the notion of being in deep communication as part of the definition of civilianhood. If my argument comes full circle, I will eventually be able to show that individuals can work within codes but not get trapped in them if deep communication keeps them connected to all possible codes. We must explore these issues if we wish to demobilize. Only as a democracy of connected citizens can the citizens of a republic reverse a military takeover. People in a world of literary inscriptions can undo the technical mobilizations now in place only by becoming civilians. Civilians are citizens constitutively engaged in deep communication. This phrase invokes the theme of language, which, if duly addressed, takes us to the arena of literary discourse where the public expects this work to take place. It is disingenuous to try to correct the public on this matter.

Wherever you look, in and outside the literary arena, there is a deafeningly quiet consensus on the proper approach to the study of languages. You always pick one language at a time. It makes no difference whether you are a technical linguist or not. Whoever wishes to make a point standardly chooses a piece of this or that particular language. The specifics of a Hindi or an English are made to stand in for all languages, for language in general.

For tactical reasons, I state the following obvious objection to this practice. Call the objection Exhibit A. "What this practice gives you is a picture without perspective. Surely you should not pretend that the facts about Hindi are what they are, regardless of how much or how little Hindi your addressee knows. For, suppose you are coming from

an English base. The sentence <Ram will eat fish> is transparent to you. But its Hindi equivalent, <Raam machlii khaayegaa>, is at a distance that you are approaching from an English baseline. So situated, your attention contextualizes Hindi for you relative to English. You regard Hindi as a practice, but as the practice of some Other. When you take an endocentric view, you conduct your analysis entirely in Hindi, thus considering the use of Hindi as a practice of some Ourselves." Does this obvious objection address you? Do you have any use for the idea that the study of language needs to situate itself perspectivally?

My obvious point elicits a postmodern counterpoint, which runs as follows. Exhibit B. "That simple-minded perspectival proposal would equate a study from an English baseline towards a Hindi object with a study from a Hindi baseline towards an English object. Such a proposal mechanically misreads the power/knowledge geometry of the world and leaves linguistics in the grip of an Anglo-American takeover. The postmodern response encourages us to move beyond the provisional use of English that somehow governs even the discourse of these objections to objections."

Exhibit B as a postmodern response to Exhibit A's perspectival proposal makes the right kind of sense in the right context, no doubt. But the toy perspectival revision I have presented and this somewhat mindlessly generated auto-response I have added to illustrate the usual discourse both miss what I see as the real point. Namely, even a linguistic description that is couched in English and discusses material from the same language in fact performs bilingual labour. The site of these bilingual operations is where we have the real option of getting a grip on what we are doing and then radicalizing it to a new degree of seriousness. We seem to want a solution that has both practical consequences and theoretical significance. This means we have to identify the monoglossia problem exactly where it is most acute and easiest to address.

That a description of English that seems to employ only English actually operates bilingually becomes obvious in the grossest details of its instrumentation. I am choosing limited examples with toy descriptive devices to make my point. Consider phonology. A phonological study picks up the expression < tea leaves >, transcribes it as something like /ti:#li:vz/, and builds bridges with phonetics. These bridges ensure that

people who say [t <] with aspiration and those who don't. speakers who pronounce <tea> with a diphthong [ij] and the ones who use a simple long vowel [i:], still meet at the same /ti:#li:vz/, a phonological compromise spanning their phonetic diversity.

Now consider syntax. A syntactic description so analyzes the sentence <The ticket which I clearly remember I bought in June cost 458 rupees> that the verb <bought> ends up with an object in two places. One job of the description is to stretch the verb <bought> so that it governs the overt object <which>. The other task is to keep a silent copy of that word <which> somewhere between <bought> and <in June> exactly as in the parallel sentence <I bought THE TICKET in June>. The two object sites come out as follows in one labelled bracketing representation: S[NP[NP [Det[the] N[ticket]] CP[NP[which] S[NP[I] VP[Adv[clearly] V [remember] CP[S[NP[I] VP[V[bought] NP [WHICH] PP[P[in] NP [June]]]]]]]]] VP[V[cost] NP[Q[458] N[rupees]]]]. I have shown the silent WHICH in capitals.

The first point to notice here is that the levels of description, such as phonology and syntax, are marked by distinctive formal instrumentation anchored in a universal vocabulary. In the case of phonology this vocabulary comprises features of pronunciation. Syntax uses a vocabulary whose elements are categorial features that categories like verb, preposition and noun phrase break down into. Each level of description associates the material of a particular language like English with the thoroughly unprovincial formal vocabulary driving that descriptive level. This work of associating is a translation operation. Phonology translates words into significant sound features. Syntactic description ferries between the phrases of some language and the universal format of categorically labelled bracketing representations. Linguistic description at each level is formally a translation and thus works bilingually. This was my first point.

My second point is that linguistic description works the examples from particular languages not into a pristine universal gold, but into usable currency that hugs closely the diversity it makes sense of. The phonology of <tea leaves> notices and interconnects the various ways you can say these words and be understood. These various ways thereby end up counting as equivalent. The syntax of the sentence <The ticket which I clearly remember that I bought a month ago cost 458 rupees>

emphasizes the two places where the object of the verb <bought> is located. It has to make sense of the fact that the object gets to be in two places at once. The syntactic type of diversity and equivalence is not quite what you just saw in phonology. Each level has its own way of making sense and connecting. This always involves some going to and fro between the things it connects.

It is therefore inaccurate to say the translation-like operation of describing just goes back and forth between the particular stuff of a language and the general format of phonological or syntactic description. You cannot afford to typecast your instrumentation and your data by calling the described stuff provincially opaque and the descriptive format universally transparent. The drama of describing stages many little acts of translative connection. These engage with opacity and transparency at each site. Linguistic description not only translates. That had been my first point. It also consists of translations. This is the second point.

This had always been a latent problem with any kind of linguistic description anywhere, within and outside a formal discipline of linguistics. Here you are, working with a translation apparatus at every level of your description. Yet, ironically, you consider it normal to apply it to what is visualized as one particular language at a time. If all is translation and diversity, just what are these particular languages? Must we take them seriously?

The rosy response is to hope that this question will release a radicalism enabling linguisticians and literarians to embrace each other and achieve a spectacular peace. But you steel yourself for reality. The UG or Universal Grammar that contemporary formal linguists swear by may well invalidate the notion of particular languages. But the way UG does this gets into a traffic jam with standard forms of the postmodern enterprise. My road map metaphor in response to this traffic jam marks my faith in the redemption still within reach.

Let us get back to the universal formal vocabulary of a linguistic level like phonology or syntax. What work does the universality of this vocabulary do? Suppose I grant that a describer translates from English (or Hindi, or any) words into a universal language of sound feature configurations, from English sentences into a neutral medium of syntactic category geometry. Well, who speaks this language? If it is

a piece of scientific notation, what have you achieved by inventing it? Does it, in fact, help you to understand matters of perspective in the sense of the simple-minded question in Exhibit A, and to get around Exhibit B?

Early formal linguisticians were ill-equipped to pose or answer such questions back in the fifties and sixties, which was the last time literarians read them with any care. Human agendas being what they are, literarians got put off, stopped listening, and continued to perform well in their own work. I am using the bantering tribal terms *linguistician* and *literarian* to indicate that it is time the two tribes got back together again for reasons that pertain both to what has been done and to what is now waiting for a joint effort.

Since the eighties, there has been a functioning UG (Universal Grammar) that is more than just set of symbols. This UG is a demonstration that languages really are, at the formal human level and not merely at a historical cultural level, so closely connected that it technically makes no sense any more to recognize distinct languages as units. There is, formally, only one human language with various words attached that make it look as if we speak different languages.

Paradoxically, this by itself is no basis for an instant alliance between current linguistics and current *pomo* discourse. UG does of course make it impossible to sustain a theoretical base for the tired national modernisms that the public still lives by but *pomo* theoreticians have long abandoned. The problem is that if there are no national languages then, *a fortiori*, there cannot be any sublanguages either that might require rescue from their hegemony. The rescuable victim categories and their theoretico spokespeople find themselves in the position of that French high school student. She went home after listening to her teacher Simone de Beauvoir's eloquence about how there is no such thing as a Jew or a Gentile, there are only people. This Jewish student then said to her Jewish mother, "Mummy, Mummy, my philosophy professor says we don't exist."

I am not trying to trivialize the frustrating standoff that is occurring just where there should be a radical breakthrough. I am trying to muster the humour we will need to see our lucid way out of this mess involving nice people in a traffic jam with nice people.

I see the problem as follows. The main issue in the literarian's enterprise at the pomo moment has been how to make theoretical sense of various distortions in the flow of textual expression. If you make sense of the distortions, you can find ways to remove them. This enterprise, if successful, encourages all addressers to express, and all addressees to receive with sympathy, the distinctive viewpoints reflecting the situations and experiences that flesh is heir to. From such a viewpoint, it looks as if the task of removing barriers must include pushing technical formal studies of language off the agenda. For literarians tend to be relativists, uniformly suspicious of all universalisms. To such a gaze, the very premises of any linguistics look like obvious effects of hegemonic forces.

Formal linguisticians have found the cultural studies approach exactly like earlier literary scholarship, strongly but unreflectively committed by default to older forms of linguistics. Someone who has not reflectively adopted a new theory obviously tends to keep the old ones that pass for common sense. One problem in the present case is that attachment to old defaults locks literary theories into national modernism as the ultimate horizon of the imaginable. All the talk of crises leaves the cultural studies enterprise in a self-defeating posture as long as it does not move into a linguistics that has truly abandoned the national imaginary. Conversely, linguisticians stay attached to old defaults about literature, along the lines of national modernism, and lock themselves into self-defeat. This is the shape of our traffic jam.

Let me make the failure more concrete in a way that picks on linguisticians. Consider the following sentence: "The ticket which I distinctly remember that I purchased it a number of weeks ago cost 458 rupees." A linguisticians is likely to hold this up for inspection and to claim that it exemplifies Indian English. She will go on to say something serious and syntactic about how the word <it> teams up with the word <which>. The point she will make is of genuine theoretical interest and even betokens a radically non-national linguistics that our literarians can learn from. But the moment she calls this an Indian English sentence, she invites the inference that there should be an Indian English community. Her subtext is not a room of one's own, but a literature of one's own for which the community's real members count as the primarily responsible cultivators. The implication is that there are real and unreal members.

Our linguistcian has fully grown wings ready to fly in an unpossessed sky. But she walks on territory whose ownership documents she unreflectively fails to contest. She sometimes even endorses these ownership claims to avoid hassles that might impede what she considers her work. This assumption of a literary community default that backs such possession boundaries is where her self-defeat mirrors that of the literarians. For the literarians are trying to address dispossession, and the form of their efforts conjures up old images of possession that they attribute to a default linguistics. Neither linguisticians nor literarians have fashioned an enterprise that avoids the lazy assignment of defaults. But the means for doing this already exist. The point is to use them.

The point is to consciously create defaults instead of vaguely attributing them to somebody else's expertise. Such defaults can only reflect a normative public enterprise of fashioning tentative and revisable canons and of sponsoring the verbal cultivation that linguistic and literary education leads all citizens into. Both linguisticians and literarians know that the old public enterprises wrongly pretended that the forces underwriting the standard modern canons and cultivations could implicitly speak for entire communities. Heterogeneity is now recognized as such and invites negotiation. The codes to be cultivated on such a negotiated social basis are spaces we build. But such constructing presumes that the citizens who wish to work this out understand not only the culture of literature but also the nature of language. Unless expert advisors arrange for this presumption to come true, the public stays in a state of ill-informed anxiety, and the negotiations fail to get off the ground. Therefore the old normativities continue, although we all know that the justifications for them are obsolete.

To summarize, I propose postulating the code as a space of cultivation. But the soil is a natural given, whose parameters yield only to scientific inquiry, which we have just seen happens to involve translation of one sort. It pays to notice that literary cultivation has always been translative in a closely related sense.

Of course the translations that go into literary analysis look very different from what I pointed to when I was talking about linguistic description. But the two kinds of translation share a vitally important strand of work. Both linguistic and literary analysis try to image clearly

certain formal objects at which very different personal actions and experiences meet. In the literary case, these formal objects are texts; in the linguistic case, they are words and sentences. What the formal object does in both domains is bridge the gaps between experiences that differ from each other at the detailed level but get connected at and through the formal object expressing their connectability. A speaker who pronounces [tɪ ɪjvz] and one who says [ti livz] both know that the phonology of /ti:li:vz/ puts them in touch. This knowledge is attached, as a meaning, to their action of pronouncing and of hearing others. A reader who identifies with a baffled English recipient of advaita philosophy in ***A Passage to India*** rejoices at a passage such as "In other words anything is everything, and nothing is something". In contrast, a reader who finds advaita normal and English bafflement a malady to be cured reads the passage calmly as a symptom. These two readers are connected at Forster's passage and know that they are. Literary analysis must image this knowledge of theirs and associate it with Forster, which is a step more complex than the task of linguistic analysis. But I have taken up these simple examples with some rigorous gestures to point out that both literary and linguistic analysis involve translative connection as well as explicit or tacit knowledge of the fact of substance-to-substance connectability through language and literature as form.

We need to get a grip on this identity of knowledge and connectability. It will yet find us a way for humans to sneak past the cultural tariff barriers and reestablish civilization. Cultures thrive on writing that is loud in principle. The reality of civilization lies in the quiet informality of speaking across writings. If the writing constitutive of culture is a secondary supplement to supposedly primary or natural speaking and if deconstruction gives the lie to this binary, then in such a picture civilization comes out as the much quieter tertiary speaking beyond that supplement.

Achieving this conversational quietness is tantamount to becoming true civilians, who are constitutively in a state of deep communication.

Civilianization

Actual communicating is confined to what you end up being able to do. Deep communication has to do with the potentials that make sense

of what you do as well as of what you end up not finding time for. To be in deep communication is not necessarily to perform a new action called deeply communicating. For the cognitively interpretable connectability between actions embedded in the formal objects of cultural cultivation to count as the civilizational dimension need not imply that beyond cultures we are trying to postulate a new type of entity called a civilization.

What I am trying to point to, as I press the terms Civilization and Deep Communication into a type of service that stresses what translation contributes to the labour of understanding that goes into every bit of language, is the inappropriateness of our current arrangements. We act as if the words we give and take are the property of this or that provincial language. We apologize for transgressing boundaries, we speak of loan-words and other borrowings.

One way to exit from this bizarre and by our own lights obsolete style is for us to emphasize the conventional, constructed, postulated, cultivated nature of each linguistic-literary arena. As we stress the need to revise the old cultivations by way of expropriating their elite sponsors and so forth, we can use the convenient pomo machinery to affirm the cultivatedness of the literary arenas that the public wishes to call languages. If we are able to pull this off, the relevant public systems (national or subnational, as the case may be for a particular language) openly recognize that they construct their hold on the imagination through specific means such as films, fiction, edutainment, prizes. That this is a political, commercial, sentimental fashioning of human cultural space will stop bothering people if serious commentators in the domain help us all to take this in our stride. I visualize literary analysts at the heart of such an endeavour, in dialogue with expertise partners in the social sciences, both generalists and experts recognizing each other's crucial contribution. On this take, literary analysis can validly exist only as a metapolitics clear about its general role as a public philosophizing.

But recall that I regard such work as fit for quiet, composed civilians rather than passionate mobilizees driven to such passion by their secret manipulators. I associate this composure with knowledge as connectability. Recall that the connections work through translation. In that part of my depiction, what I visualize includes lower and higher

operations of translation that put this self-consciously fashioned analysis of cultural-textual fashioning in touch with language as a natural reality and with language as civilization.

To put it differently, I persist in imagining a natural initial spoken language on which the supplement of writing supervenes. Despite the illusory character of this image, I find it a convenient format for the postulations that the social processes envisaged here encourage people to share. The secondary supplement mocks the initial self-image of speech as a self-sufficient primacy. As I redraw the picture, this mocking is gentle, for both terms of the binary are constituted differently at the tertiary trans-supplement, the point at which civilization subverts culture.

Civilians are citizens of nation-like cultural spaces who see themselves as capable of this gentleness and who nonetheless are willing, perforce, to live with the loudness of modern cultural fashioning as long as the public finds it necessary to keep the volume at these impossible levels. Civilianization works by initiating conversations in the speech that does not precede writing, but plurally follows and therefore subverts it in a translative mode.

In my book, civilianizing translation cannot avoid maintaining an ironic relation with the basic translations into universal phonetic and syntactic notation familiar from linguistic description. As the civilianization process strives towards a new transparency that does not flinch from dealing with all the opacities of our world, it touches base with the universality available in the human alphabet itself that language rests on. It thereby pays homage to the duly mobilized linguisticians who guard that base and to the emphatically demobilized literarians who surround it with music.

May these and other tribes continue to flourish, and to serve what lies beyond our national worship systems.

THE BLESSINGS OF THE MARGIN

"Almost every word I write jars against the next", Kafka wrote in his Journal. "I hear the consonants rub leadenly against each other and the vowels sing an accompaniment like Negroes in a minstrel show."¹ A year later, he remembers: "As a child I was anxious, and if not anxious then uneasy, when my father spoke— as he often did, since he was a businessman— of the last day of the month (called the "ultimo"). Since I wasn't curious, and since I wasn't able— even if I sometimes did ask about it— to digest the answer quickly enough with my slow thinking, and since a weakly stirring curiosity once risen to the surface is often already satisfied by a question and an answer without requiring that it understand as well, the expression "the last day of the month" remained a disquieting mystery for me."² Instead of quoting further statements like these, we might want to think of his friends, but first of all Kafka himself, bursting out into laughter at the lecture of the first chapter of *The Trial*.³

Someone who laughs in this exuberant way at his work, someone who accuses himself of being idle to think and having but a weak curiosity, someone, finally, who disregards his own writing and who, in all that, is one of our greatest poets, must be suspected of an enormous understatement. Considering that he was a newcomer among the other writers and quite unique and singular in his kind of writing— how could he not have been, if not sure, then at least aware of his superiority, his greatness? Kafka indeed was unaware of his exceptional position as a writer. That is why he hesitated to accept the invitation to write a novel for the German publisher Rowohlt asking him. His friend Max Brod had to encourage him.⁴ In his own eyes, all he did was scribbling.⁵

Out of that suspicion grew a highly ironic way of looking at things and speaking about them, and this applies first and foremost to his comments about his own writings. Kafka is a master of irony. It is

a subtle, quite hidden irony where frank jokes are rare. People today read and re-read Kafka in order to find something to laugh at, and they don't, for Kafka does not openly poke fun at anything. He accepts facts, he sticks to the facts, insisting even upon them. Klaus Wagenbach in his comprehensive research on Kafka's early years remarks: "the object occupies all the positions without leaving a place neither for premonition nor for memory".⁶

That is Kafka's problem. Facts— things, objects, situations— are incontestably there. Kafka remains in front of them, accepting them. That is the signature of his writing: he gives voice to pure facts without any rhetoric or ornamentation. These facts, however, stop functioning in the way we are accustomed to. The result is an irony not so much situated at the level of the signifier, but in the way of saying or presenting things.⁷ This produces the effect of a fine humour which can increase and turn into a joke— if facts would not be so seriously real and even threatening. Kafka's humour produced by irony is black humour.

The beginning of his novel *The Trial* sets an evident example for it. One ironic situation follows after the other: K. wakes up and is waiting for his breakfast which his landlady's cook would usually bring him at eight o'clock in the morning. This time she does not come. When he rings the bell, an unknown man enters. Ignoring K.'s questions, he returns to the neighbouring room laughing with another man at the curious idea of K. wanting Anna to bring him his breakfast. For the reader, this laughter is the first signal of irony and its humoristic effect. K. jumps out of his bed, pulls on his trousers, and enters into the neighbouring room. He finds out that his breakfast cannot be served any longer because he is arrested and that the two unknown persons are his guardians. In his efforts to prove his innocence, K. flounders like a fish at the line in front of the guardians who are as impenetrable as the wall of the law itself; an ironic and quite humorous situation as well. During the conversation, K. realizes that they are enjoying his breakfast which is another case of humour of situation. They tell him that a law exists which is attracted by the guilt of "the public" so that it is quite consequent that K. is guilty, as it had pointed him out, even though K. does not understand anything. Another irony results from K.'s claiming his innocence, while having to admit on the other side

that he does not know the law. The commentary of Franz, one of the guardians, reveals the humour of this situation: "Look at this, William, he admits he does not know the law and at the same time insists he's innocent". In these kinds of confrontation lies the irony and the following situations shall still produce other humorous effects. *

We are today far too accustomed to read Kafka in an existentialist, religious, psychological or still another way; we sympathize with the pitiful personage and see in his destiny the reflection of our own problematic modernity. But if we forget these usual interpretations and look at this situation with new, innocent eyes, if we look at it as a concrete mobile picture, a sort of a film-strip, then all the humorous irony of the scene becomes apparent. The logic is turned upside down. The law is not made by man, but the man is made by the law. The consequence is that K. is hopelessly entangled in it and all he is saying and doing in the way which is normal in his eyes becomes ridiculous in our eyes, because it is now illogic, discordant, so that K. turns into a silly persona, we can laugh at, in his vain efforts to defend himself or to escape or even to think that his colleagues play him a trick. More than that, the situation is completely absurd. We nearly do not laugh any more at absurdity; we are too accustomed to it through the surrealism which has passed by. But Kafka is the first novelist to introduce surrealism into narration. He realizes a surreal narrative form since his beginnings of writing, i.e. already in the "Description of a Battle" written in 1904/05 when nobody spoke of surrealism. The movement became solidified only in 1924 with the publication of the first manifesto. Kafka's texts, however, show already the humour of surrealist imagery. This imagery presupposes that the most distant elements can fit together, as for instance in the programmatic image by Duchamp, who posed an umbrella on a table of dissection. The scene in which K. wakes up and gets arrested is based on the same principle but transposed into narration. That is to say that the irony of Kafka is finally that of the surrealists for he joins the most remote elements: a strictly organized but unapproachable and ineffable world and its exact opposite, i.e., our inexact normal world covered by meaningless words. There are other surrealist elements in his writings as for instance the dream atmosphere as the most normal envelopment of the daily course of things. At that time these techniques were so new, even for Kafka himself, that he and

his friends could not help laughing, all the more that things slipping away swell and, as in *The Trial* (1912), a small clear image becomes a whole world impossible to survey. The reason of this is that things work now on their own, that is to say in a poetical way, where the relationship among the elements and the associations it provokes organize the text and carry their own logic in a most consequent and irrefutable, but also in a most widespread way until its bitter end, i.e. until the self-destruction of this new world. The inner logic becomes autonomous not far from being automatic passing over the struggling K. who tries in vain to dominate his new reality. At the end of the novel, he is condemned to death without having seen any judge or having passed in front of the court, as it is said at the very end. Kafka's irony has made reality an enormous absurdity.

II

Thus, one can say that one of the major signals of K.'s irony is the stressing of the not normal as normality while proving this by endlessly increasing the logic of the text with the enormous absurd complication of the world at the end or even its self-destruction. The effect may be ironical— even with some open humour— it is first of all a surrealist method of writing.

The text thus seems to assume the disguise of an intellectual game. That is the perspective imposing itself when one reads the diary entry of the 25th of December, 1911, in which Kafka speaks of minor literatures. Referring to the current Jewish literature of Warsaw and the Czech literature of the time, he does defend here the literature of small nations. As in his novel, *The Trial*, Kafka propounds a completely absurd hypothesis: small nation means small literature and that is to say "bad literature", "yet which is better than great literature, and then he lets this thought follow its inner logic as it were touched by a magic wand, while the inner logic is based on the criteria of small literature. What are these criteria?

The inner logic shows that small literature has the same effects as great literatures and much more than that: it has a "creative and beneficent force" which great literatures cannot have, for small literature lacks outstanding talents, which, on the other hand, causes a great vivacity and interest in literature. Everybody feels concerned; literature

is a concern of the people. Thus, the figure of irony here is: the less talents, the more creativity. The ironic figures continue: the "creative and beneficent force" of small literatures draws in a particular way from dead authors. Their past and present influence becomes so matter-of-fact that it can be confounded with their writings. "One speaks of the latter and means the former, indeed, one even reads the latter and sees only the former." In short: not only dead authors are more important than the living authors, but the critics of their work have more influence than the works themselves. Another characteristic of small literature stems from the claim the national consciousness of a small people exerts on the individual: Everyone has to know, to support and to defend it— "to defend it even if he does not know it and support it". Kafka continues arguing that small literatures offer themselves to the treatment of petty themes in correspondence to small enthusiasms, however sustained by "their polemical possibilities". Thus it happens that subjects of passing interest in great literature absorb everyone in small literature "no less than as a matter of life and death".

This catalogue of characteristics of small literatures— of which only a part has been presented here— is generally understood in the critical studies on Kafka as a highly serious consideration. Yet, a close reading proves the contrary. Who could believe that Kafka seriously equates small and bad literature? It is an equation just for the sake of a logical exercise. Likewise, one cannot believe that he defends bad literature and defends even its "creative and beneficent force", that he promotes a lack of talent, enabling everyone to be a writer, to speak of literature, and to enter into the public literary debate. Who can finally believe that Kafka thinks seriously that literature is so much more alive that it does not have great examples and that its most creative force is based on the interpretation and not on the writings of its dead authors, or that those small topics of polemics could induce a decision between life and death. All these hypotheses are so tremendously absurd and lead to such a swelling complication that at the end the self-destruction of the nation is at stake, as is proven by the idea of polemics settled at the border of life and death. As it was said before, these are the signs of a surrealist text. In his diary, Kafka happens to take liberties of writing that served him as stylistic and logical exercises with regard to his great works.

Deleuze and Guattari, however, in their famous comment of this text,

remain on its surface, reading it in its first sense, without a tinge of a doubt concerning the seriousness of Kafka, but not caring about it, either. What they are interested in is not to propose a close reading but a free interpretation of the text. Thus, they underline the idea of “deterritorialisation” which includes Kafka’s idea of small— they call it “minor” ¹⁰— literature. Another feature they stress is its political character. However, for Kafka, small literature is a concern of the people, whereas he sees its political dimension in a very critical sense. Indeed, one is looking for a boundary with politics, “one even strives to see it before it is there”, ¹¹ and, as he continues, again from an ironic perspective, one “often sees this limiting boundary everywhere”, but on the other hand, “the inner independence of the literature makes the external connection with politics harmless” so that the result is the dissemination of the small literature in the country “on the basis of political slogans.”

Yet, Deleuze and Guattari take up Kafka’s observation that all is an affaire of the whole people and thereby point to a third characteristic of minor literature : “all takes a collective value”. ¹² However, they argue in form of a hypertrophy which is far from Kafka’s reasoning quoted above. The French critics conclude indeed: “The literary machine becomes thus a relay of a revolutionary machine in the future.” And they take the three categories elaborated by them as a guarantee of this revolutionary character of all minor literatures: “That is to say that “minor” does not qualify any more certain literatures, but the revolutionary conditions of every literature in the middle of those called great (or established) ones.” ¹³ Against this background, they understand Kafka’s praise of literature without talents. In the eyes of the critics, Kafka argues for a literature without a master’s, that is an author’s reasonable and individual voice. “What the writer is saying on his own constitutes already a common action.” ¹⁴ Thus, they connect their idea of a collective literature with Kafka’s poetical decision to suppress the narrator and with his rejection, as they put it, of a literature written by an author or a master: “Doubtlessly, at a certain point of time, Kafka thought in the traditional categories of two subjects, the author and the hero, the narrator and the persona, the dreamer and the dream. But he quickly renounces the principle of the narrator as he will, in spite of this admiration of Goethe, renounce a literature of an author or a master.” ¹⁵

III

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the author has two possibilities to find his own platform of writing in a minor way, which means that the French critics have parted far from Kafka's text following now the study of Wagenbach mentioned above: either artificially enrich language, that is for instance to puff up the German of Prague, a direction most authors around Kafka took,¹⁶ or, on the contrary, excavate the language much more than it has already been done and to sober it, in other words: to oppose a purely intensive practice to the other symbolic one. In this regard, they oppose Joyce's exuberant language to Beckett's reduction of language. Also in Kafka they see a writer who reacts in the sense of the second possibility. Kafka still stresses the minor elements. They formulate it in their terms: "Speaking, and first of all writings, means fasting"¹⁷ for Kafka. And they comment: "Kafka kills intentionally all metaphor, all symbolism, all signification, not less than all designation. The metamorphosis is the contrary of the metaphor. There is no more proper meaning nor figurative sense, but rather a distribution of states in the fan of a word."¹⁸ Intensity and sobriety,— and I would add neutrality— are the rules of this revolutionary minor writing which becomes a neutral cry in the desert.¹⁹

If one adopts the inventive point of view of their linguistic approach to Kafka, one can follow their conclusions. But one must realize that the critics argue from within the restricted perspective of the historical linguistic situation of Prague and especially of the historical situation of Kafka in Prague. Thus, they do not see a third possibility of revolutionary, minor writing. Another poet of another minor society, the German Jewish people at Czernowitz in the Bukowina, a region which belongs to Romania today, proposes this third kind of writing. I think of Paul Celan. His way is the combination of both reactions considered by Deleuze and Guattari but brought together in such a way that all elements are deconstructed at the very moment when they are pronounced / written down, so that, at the end, the reader is confronted with a new language.

Paul Celan does not utilise metaphors either, but he makes use of other linguistic possibilities, imagery and word material in abundance. He renews the German language like nobody else since World War II. At the same time, his individual voice is recognizable. But of course,

he does not impose any meaning in form of an autocratic speaking. The poet is far from having such an attitude. But one can hear his voice of suffering—he has lost his parents, he evokes particularly his mother, in a working camp of the Nazis in the Ukraine—and all the poetry of Celan is a remembrance of the Holocaust. Yet all who suffer would find their voice in his poetry. They are referred to by him as individuals or as groups. His voice has a common value, as Deleuze and Guattari understand it for the writing without talent, with the difference that with Celan, we are confronted with one of the greatest German poets.

His language is thus crooked by the burden of historical references, by quotations and other linguistic forms. The reader often has to read his poetry with a dictionary at hand. But all this material is there in order to be surpassed. Celan does not exclude any detail; on the contrary, he opens the words to as many allusions as possible, but in order to deconstruct the language and thereby destroy false meanings, prejudices, unconscious linguistic habits and restore a new, sober, intensive language related—not identical—to that of Kafka.

The poem "Tübingen, January" from *Die Niemandrose* ("The No One's Rose") (1963) shall be briefly analyzed in order to provide an example.

Tübingen, January

Eyes talked into
blindness.
Their — "an enigma is
the purely
originated"—, their
memory of
Hölderlin towers afloat, circled
by whirring gulls.

Visits of drowned joiners to
these
submerging words:
Should,
should a man,
should a man come into
the world, today, with

Tübingen, Januar

Zur Blindheit über-
redete Augen.
Ihre — "ein
Rätsel ist Rein-
entsprungenes"—ihre
Erinnerung an
schwimmende Hölderlintürme, möven-
umschwirrt.

Besuche ertrunkener Schreiner bei
diesan
tauchenden Worten:
Käme,
käme ein Mensch,
käme ein Mensch zur Welt, heute, mit

the shining beard of the
 patriarchs: he could,
 if he spoke of this
 time, he
 could
 only babble and babble
 over, over
 againagain.

dem Lichtbart der
 Patriarchen: er dürfte,
 spräch er von dieser
 Zeit, er
 dürfte
 nur lallen und lallen
 immer-, immer-
 zuzu.

("Pallaksch. Pallaksch.") ²⁰

("Pallaksch. Pallaksch.") ²¹

Celan evokes Hölderlin here, another great suffering German author who lived in the 18th century. Celan felt himself particularly close to him. He evokes Hölderlin not by his name but by quoting one of his famous poems and by referring to his anecdotal situation — Hölderlin lived about thirty years in a tower of the house of a joiner who took care of the mad poet who often utilised the word "Pallaksch", which he pronounced twice, as a form of approval or negation. More or less in the middle of the poem, Celan evokes the famous joiner in the plural form. He now is drowned and pays a visit to the submerging words. The preposition is ambiguous. It means to go to the words or near them, but also to pay a visit at the moment when "these" words submerge. As always in the poetry of Celan, the ambiguity is important. Here, it designates the dissolution of language, which is the basis for building a new and pure one. It will be at the limit of language like the neologism of Hölderlin. But who are the drowned joiners? In this context it is obvious; they refer also to the dissolved poetic subject as another craftsman, swimming near by—and to—the dissolved language from where he is writing in a collective new language. This image shows at the same time the platform from where the poet speaks. It is in pure dissolution beyond every fix term or element or, one can also say, it is the place of the undeterminable 'in between' where the poet experiences himself as a simple craftsman who works on his language in order to build up a new world to live in, had thereby continuing the work Kafka had begun when he unhinged the world by his ironical, surrealist process of writing.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1. Kafka: Diary, 15.12.1910, <http://victorian.fortunecity.com/vermeer/287/diary1910.htm> (30.06.05).
2. Kafka: Diary, 24.12.1911, <http://victorian.fortunecity.com/vermeer/287/diary1911pt2.htm> (30.06.05).
3. Max Brod: Über Franz Kafka, *Frankfurt am Main 1974*, p. 156 (The German critics referred to have been translated by SBN.).
4. Klaus Wagenbach: Franz Kafka, *Eine Biographie seiner Jugend*, Bern: A. Franck AG, Verlag, 1958, p.158
5. Did he really not recognize the new form of writing he introduced? We should be careful. He was perhaps simply aiming at a still greater perfection approaching thus still more the vision he had of his own writing.
6. Wagenbach, op.cit., p. 116.
7. Irony is conceived as a linguistic form of representation where facts, things, or situations do not have the usual meaning. A disconnection exists between them which one could call an ironic fall. Things are different from what they are expected to be as for instance in Cervantes' novel *Don Quijote* which is entirely built on this linguistic process. Different forms of humour can be the result of the ironic fall, but also the so-called tragic irony. -- Critics, generally, speak of Kafka's irony at the level of the signifier or in reference to particular cases. They do not realise Kafka's irony as a fundamental narrative procedure; see for instance Hans H. Hiebel : Franz Kafka: Form und Bedeutung. Formanalysen und Interpretationen von "Vor dem Gericht", etc. Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 1999, p. 18, 79, e.a.
8. Wagenbach refers also to the humour of situation in the early work of Kafka.
9. Kafka: Diary, 25.12.1911, <http://victorian.fortunecity.com/vermeer/287/diary1911pt2.htm> (30.06.06). In the English version, the word "bad" is translated by "poor": for the following summary see also there.
10. Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, *Kafka. Pour une littérature mineure*, Paris, Minuit, 1975, p. 30. (The quotations of this critic are translated by SBN).
11. Kafka : Diary, 26.12.1911, <http://victorian.fortunecity.com/vermeer/287/diary1911pt2.htm> (30.06.05); see there also for the following quotations.
12. Deleuze, Guattari, op.cit., p. 31.
13. Op. cit., p. 33.
14. Op. cit., p. 31.
15. Op. cit., p. 32.
16. Deleuze and Guattari are right to refer in this context to the "excellent" chapter III in Wagenbach, *Kafka*, op.cit.; see esp. pp. 72 sq.
17. Deleuze, Guattari, op. cit., p. 36.

18. Op. cit., p. 40.
19. Op. cit., p. 47 sq. In this commentary of the minor language of Kafka, one can recognize the influence of Mallarmé's concept of poetical language. According to it, the writer disappears and language unfolds itself.
20. Celan, "Tübingen, January", from "Die Niemandsrose" (04.08.05)
21. Celan, Tübingen, Jänner, in: *Werke in fünf Bänden*, ed. by Beda Allemann and Stefan Feichert, in collab. with Rolf Bücher, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1983, t.I, p. 226.

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**MIKE DAVIS'S *DEAD CITIES AND OTHER TALES*:
URBAN HISTORY AS NARRATIVE**

Though Mike Davis's *Dead Cities and Other Tales* was published in 2002, eleven of the eighteen articles collected there were published in the ten years preceding 2001-02. Understandably, the fateful events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent weeks become a focal point in his prefatory remarks; but his well-documented analyses of American cities as "black utopia", of imagined doom projecting itself on to real doom, are pursuits taken up long before the destruction of the twin towers. It is the intention of this article to raise certain issues concerning some of the narrative devices employed by Mike Davis in *Dead Cities and Other Tales*, to cite examples of these devices and then proceed to examine how far the tales take history away from the canon of factuality, and challenge the border between fiction and nonfiction.¹

Mike Davis's is a fractured journey through parts of America where the apocalypse has already taken place and where the destruction of the twin towers seems an almost inevitable climax. His narrative does not steadily gain momentum. Rather it is woven around a central subject; he dips in and out of it. The subject draws together a montage of images and ideas held in place by Davis's acute eye for human pathos and contemporary social mores. The use of these narrative devices in nonfiction is nothing new. Davis is probably aware of this when calling the articles "tales." But there may be other, more serious, reasons we will later notice.

II

In the "tale" called "Hollywood's Dark Shadow" (2000), cinematic exploring of the city as a "Dark Place" is traced back to Dickens's *American Notes* (1842) which includes the novelist's "expedition to New York's notorious Five Points." Dickens finds here a parallel to London's

Seven Dials: "the coarse and bloated faces at the doors have counterparts at home, and all the wide world over."² Whatever the nature of Dickens's perception, his description of the Five Points as an archive of vices and miseries was "of potential fascination to the middle class," satisfying their "peculiar need to be simultaneously horrified, edified, and titillated."³ Following Dickens's lead, American bestsellers like E.Z.C. Judson's *Mysteries and Miseries of New York* (1848) and Mathew Hale Smith's *Sunshine and Shadow in New York* (1868) were written. Davis goes on to show how, even when Five Points had perished, "the hell's Kitchen waterfront remained potent Dickensian terrain"⁴ and was used in films like *The Docks of New York* (1928).

No corresponding image of Los Angeles existed in literature when Hollywood came to establish itself as the centre of the film industry. The city in Hollywood was all stage set until a literary referent was created. Davis mentions Raymond Chandler as the creator of "the noir streets of Los Angeles" that would later guide Hollywood, but focuses principally on the writer John Fante and the painter Millard Sheets whose works appeared earlier. In the early depression, Fante wrote stories constituting Bunker Hill's human melodrama. His characters came from Bunker Hill's "cosmopolitan ethnic mix": Filipino bachelors, Chicana waitresses, aspiring Italian-Americans.

The Bunker Hill that Fante evoked for Mencken's readers was Los Angeles's most crowded and urban neighborhood. According to the 1940 census, its population increased almost 20 per cent during the Depression since it provided the cheapest housing for Downtown's casual workforce as well as for pensioners, disabled war veterans, Mexican and Filipino immigrants, and men whose identities were best kept in shadow. Its nearly two thousand dwellings ranged from oil prospector's shacks and turn-of-the-century tourist hotels to the decayed but still magnificent Queen Anne and Westlake mansions of the city's circa-1800 elites. Successive Works Progress Administration and city housing commission reports chronicled its dilapidation (60 percent of its structures were considered "dangerous"), arrest rates (eight times the city average), health problems (tuberculosis and syphilis), and drug culture (the epicenter of marijuana and cocaine use).⁵

For Bunker Hill, the big break in films came with Robert Siodmark's *Cris Cross* (1949). Though the story line is built around a love triangle